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ABSTRACT

Washington, Natalia T. PhD, Purdue University, December 2015. Mental Health and
Human Minds: Some Theoretical Criteria for Clinical Psychiatry. Major Professor: Daniel
Kelly.
When it comes to the topic of mental illness, there are three broad areas of concern that
are of interest to all of us as human beings—and to the theorists, researchers, and clinicians
who wish to offer help—besides knowing what our symptoms are. First, we might be
interested in finding out some normative facts about ourselves as individuals, such as
whether or not we are mentally healthy, perhaps to what extent, and how this should affect
our motivations. A second area of concern involves descriptive facts our minds. In what
ways do we deviate from typical human psychological nature, and what implications does
this have? A third concern is about diagnosis, the familiar labels like ‘bipolar 1’ and
‘obsessive compulsive’ which inform our very being. Ought any of these apply to us?
Clinical psychiatry, understood broadly as a practice which integrates science,
theory, and clinical observation for the purpose of understanding and promoting mental
health, is the most vital tool we have for answering these questions, and combatting the
suffering caused by mental illness. Without a critical understanding of what good clinical
reasoning consists in, however, it is simultaneously our most dangerous tool. Without it, we
risk amplifying suffering rather than combatting it, by failing to distinguish and respond
appropriately to illness and health. This project examines the nature of clinical reasoning
from a theoretical perspective, by proposing some conditions for a discipline which pays
heed to psychiatry’s dual nature as a science and as an evaluative system—with the hope that
a proper understanding of mental illness and mental disorder will follow from an
understanding of the enterprise of clinical psychiatry itself.
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1. INTRODUCTION

“I am but mad north-north-west: when the wind is
Southerly I know a hawk from a handsaw.”
--Hamlet Act 2 Scene 2, William Shakespeare
1. What is Good Clinical Reasoning?
On September 13th, 2014, 32-year-old Kamilah Brock, entered NYPD precinct PSA 6 to
find the whereabouts of her impounded car. Claiming she was making them nervous,
police handcuffed Brock and forcibly removed her to Harlem Hospital. During her
involuntary stay there, Brock was repeatedly sedated with lorazepam and lithium against
her will despite showing no signs of violent behavior. In an effort to gain her freedom,
Brock repeatedly told hospital staff—truthfully—that she was a gainfully employed banker,
and that President Obama followed her on Twitter. Hospital staff made no effort to check
these claims, called them delusional, and made their repudiation a condition of her release.
Brock was held there for eight days (Law Offices, 2015).1
Exactly a month later on November 13th, 37-year-old mother Tanisha Anderson,
diagnosed with schizophrenia, was killed by police responding to a non-emergency call
from her family (Beres, 2015). Anderson is just one of many individuals in recent years,
with history of mental illness, who have had the misfortune of becoming victims of police
violence when they in fact sought aid (Santos & Goode, 2014; Ernst & Putzel, 2014).
Especially in cases of threatened suicide, the prospect of calling 911 is a growing fear
among loved ones. And where there are not loved-ones to look to for support, many
sufferers of mental illness in the United States end up in prison (Carey et al., 2014).
1

Apparently, not much has changed since American psychologist David Rosenhan’s experiments placing
‘pseudopatients’ in psychiatric hospitals, when after between seven and fifty-two days, all eight individuals
were discharged; but only after accepting their ‘diagnoses’ (1973).
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Clinical psychiatry, understood broadly as a practice which integrates science,
theory, and clinical observation for the purpose of understanding and promoting mental
health, is the most vital tool we have for combatting the suffering caused by mental illness.
Without a critical understanding of what good clinical reasoning consists in, however, it is
simultaneously our most dangerous tool. Without it, we risk amplifying suffering rather
than combatting it—either as in Anderson’s case by failing to respond appropriately to
genuine illness, or as in Brock’s by failing to respond appropriately to genuine cases of
health.2 Developing and engaging in an empirically minded and normatively adequate
clinical practice, then, is necessary in order to provide better care for ourselves and others.
With this project, I aim to open up a new avenue for research in the philosophy of
psychiatry which considers the nature of clinical reasoning from a theoretical perspective,
by proposing some conditions for a discipline which pays heed to psychiatry’s dual nature
as a science and as an evaluative system.3 I offer one condition in each of my three primary
chapters. To be clear at the outset, these conditions are not intended to be sufficient for
characterizing clinical psychiatry. I would be happy if others were revealed by future
research. I also do not intend to argue for any positive account of mental illness or mental
disorder. Rather I hope that a proper understanding of these and other concepts will follow
from an understanding of the enterprise of clinical psychiatry itself—this leaves a vast space
for future philosophical work, and in my concluding chapter I will outline some open
questions that strike me as particularly fruitful.
Even so, it is hard to begin a discussion about clinical reasoning without at least
some basic understanding of how terms like ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’ are used.
Before outlining the arguments of each chapter, then, it will be useful to lay some
groundwork. In the next section, I will try to elucidate a general trend in the literature, and
note how I will be using these terms in my project. I am less concerned with how well or
poorly my usages fit the trend, than I am about clearly stipulating how I will use the terms
2

It is also not a coincidence that clinical psychiatry represents an even greater danger to marginalized groups
(both Brock and Anderson are black women living in the States). Concerns of social justice disparities in
mental healthcare are an additional motivation for my project (for more see: Woolfolk, 2002; Poland &
Caplan, 2004; Banaji, 2013; Carey et al., 2014).
3
Over the past few decades, philosophers of psychiatry have been making strides in three broad areas: the
thorny conceptual issues that surround psychiatry as a science, the very idea of mental illness, and how
clinical phenomena can illuminate issues in philosophy of mind (Murphy, 2015b).
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going forward. Then, in section three, I will give a quick sketch of the relevant conception
of the discipline of psychiatry that employs these terms. A preview of my primary chapters
appears in section four.
Before moving on, a quick note on the most confounding piece of terminology in
philosophy these days—the word ‘we’: In the most general case, ‘we’ is ideally used to refer
to the group human beings, humankind, thinking things, or, perhaps, persons; as in we

tend to think that… we simply don’t know whether… or, we can agree that. The rationale
for this usage seems to rest on the idea that philosophical argument and philosophical
thought are universally valuable and universally applicable enterprises. However, there is
some controversy concerning the value and role of philosophical intuitions in making
philosophical arguments.4 Especially in the analytic tradition, much work proceeds via the
introspective and reasoning capabilities of trained experts, that is, philosophers. That the
majority of professional analytic philosophers have been and continue to be Anglo
American men has only recently been conceived of as a major biasing issue. As it turns out,
analytic philosophers aren’t great representatives of human thought (Henrich et al., 2010).
Because the overarching theme of my project concerns individual variation in the
structure and content of human the human mind (or, if you prefer, mind/brain), I am
particularly concerned with this issue. At the same time, ‘we’ can be stylistically
indispensable. I’ve already used it twice. Therefore, I will strive to use ‘we’ as shorthand for
‘we human beings’ only in those cases where the entire group is the appropriate referent.
When referring to a more restricted group I will do so explicitly by saying things like ‘we
philosophers’ or ‘we in the United States’.
2. Terminology
Consider the following case. Allie makes an appointment with a therapist because she has
been feeling melancholy and unmotivated, which has interfered with her work and social
life. What does it mean for her that she seeks a diagnosis? Presumably it is not to be told
that she feels sad, which is something she already knows. Imagine Allie had gone to her

4

For more see the Intellectual Humility Project, an international endeavor among philosophers and
psychologists interested in the cross-cultural stability of philosophical intuitions (2013).
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physician for a cough, only to be diagnosed with something called ‘coughing disease’. This
is laughably uninformative. Yet many who seek assistance for psychological symptoms like
Allie’s have just this experience. Clinical psychiatry today stands apart from physical
medicine in that there is no clear distinction between symptoms and the conditions that
underlie them. This points to one of the biggest stumbling blocks for explaining and
understanding concepts like ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’. Namely, many of the
diagnoses we are most familiar with, like ‘depression’ and ‘anxiety’, pick out sets of
disjunctive and overlapping symptoms, rather than any underlying facts that might explain
these symptoms.
There are three broad areas of concern that might be of interest to Allie, and to
other theorists, researchers, and practitioners, besides knowing what her symptoms are.
First, Allie might be interested in finding out some normative fact about herself as an
individual—whether or not she is mentally healthy, perhaps to what extent, and how this
should affect her motivations. A second area of concern involves descriptive facts about
Allie’s mind. In what ways does she deviate from typical human psychological nature, and
what implications does this have for what kind of human agent she is? Knowing these facts
will help answer questions like why is this happening and how can I change it? A third
concern is about diagnostic kinds, the interactive social kinds which take the form of those
labels like ‘bipolar 1’ and ‘obsessive compulsive’. Ought any of these apply to Allie?
These three, intimately related concerns can be roughly distinguished by the kinds
of facts which are supposed to explain Allie’s symptoms. To answer the question of why
Allie is feeling sad we might report an evaluative fact (Allie is sick), a descriptive fact (Allie
has a chronic surplus of cortisol in her system), or a classificatory fact (Allie has Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD)). Each may be a satisfactory explanation for Allie.
Unfortunately these facts can interact in complex ways. As a result, it is next to impossible
to tell, in practice whether a particular theorist thinks any of these facts entail the others, or
what the normative significance is of the explanation a theorist gives. As philosopher of
psychiatry Dominic Murphy puts it, “there is widespread agreement that our thinking about
disease pays attention to both human values and biological phenomena, and it is not always
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easy to tell… whether a given analysis is descriptive or prescriptive” (Murphy, §6, 2015a).5
To my mind, a number of disagreements over the nature of psychopathology—for example
how and whether mental diseases are related to physical diseases, how they are delineated,
and whether they are in some sense ‘constructed’—rest on this ambiguity. It interferes with
our ability to keep concepts like ‘illness’, ‘disorder’, and ‘disease’ disentangled.
Clearer conceptual tools are needed for future discussions that can help benefit
people like Allie and alleviate her mental suffering. Employing a strict theoretical boundary
between the target phenomena of clinical psychiatry’s evaluative, descriptive, and
classificatory goals is a good starting point. Therefore I propose, first, that the terms ‘health’
and ‘illness’ be used in a strictly normative sense. Regardless of whether Allie is typical or
atypical with respect to her symptoms or their underlying causes, to say that she is ill carries
the implication that there is something about her that ought to be corrected. It is a value
judgement. To put this in psychological terms then, I mean ‘being mentally ill’ to describe
any way of being in which an individual's flourishing6 is significantly impaired or limited by
some features of their psychology. To be mentally ill is to fall below some standard of
flourishing as a result of certain objective psychological facts. Exactly what the right
standards are is an interesting question I take up later in Chapter 2.
How should mental health be understood in contrast with mental illness? I mean
‘being mentally healthy’ to describe any way of being in which an individual's flourishing is
not so limited. On this way of thinking, mental health is defined negatively as the absence
of illness. Importantly, we need not think that this poses problems for using the term
‘healthy’ in a positive way—to capture a good degree of flourishing rather than just meeting
some minimum standard. In a recent paper, S. Andrew Schroeder argues that this

5

Take for example the debate between objectivists and constructivists over the concept of health in medicine.
Briefly, objectivists hold that descriptive facts about the human body alone can ground distinctions between
sick and healthy bodies, while constructivists hold that symptoms or their causes must, in addition, be
disvalued with respect to human interests (Murphy, 2015a). Many theorists in both camps end up relying on
‘disorder’, ‘disease’, and ‘illness’ as stipulated terms to differentiate between descriptive and prescriptive
claims, with individual differences as to which means what. One must engage closely with a particular author
to tell whether a claim like ‘Allie has a mental disorder’ carries normative implications, or whether this just
reports the existence of some deviation.
6
This can be a tricky piece of terminology in normative ethics, and I do not want too much to rest on it here.
For now a naïve notion will do, where flourishing is not a technical term and is more or less synonymous with
terms like well-being, welfare, or eudemonia. I will have more to say on how evaluative concepts like these
interact with our thinking about mental health in my concluding chapter.

6

confusion stems from overlooking the possibility of comparativist theory of health, where
to say that ‘X is healthy’ is to claim that X belongs to a range of individuals in some class,
where differences in that range are still differences in health (2012). On a comparativist
view of mental health, two individuals can be healthy, while one is healthier than another,
or flourishing to a greater degree. I will follow Schroeder here in taking a comparativist
view.
My second proposal concerns the targets of clinical psychiatry’s descriptive and
classificatory goals. In short, the predicate ‘has a mental disorder’ can be ambiguous
between the purely descriptive ‘is psychologically atypical’ and the evaluative ‘is
psychologically atypical and ill as a result’. I will use it only in the second sense. To say that
Allie has a mental disorder is to make both a descriptive and an evaluative claim. This may
seem like a fairly radical move, but it is one which I think is entirely warranted.
To see why, consider how the science of psychopathology is currently conceived,
the discipline that attempts to distinguish between kinds of mental illness by investigating its
underlying causes. The product of this labor, a nosology, should taxonomize different
psychological conditions, already assumed to underlie mental illness, into useful diagnostic
categories.7 Mental disorder, then, can be usefully defined in terms of mental illness. I
mean ‘has a mental disorder’ to describe a person who is mentally ill when the features of
their psychology which impair flourishing fit one or more such categories. In Allie’s case,
she has a disorder because her chronic surplus of cortisol is the cause of her suffering. This
usage should transfer a kind of normative status to the diagnostic categories of a nosology,
such that MDD, as a mental disorder, is a kind of mental illness. A good nosology fulfills a
classificatory goal. It allows us to make evaluative claims like ‘Allie is depressed’.
It may be objected that labels like MDD, when properly deployed, are not meant to
carry normative content at all but rather pick out a set of noteworthy symptoms and
underlying causes. I am sympathetic to this concern, but I believe that this usage results in a
dangerous source of confusion. To see why, consider the possibility that someone has a
psychological condition that fits some descriptive criteria even though they are mentally
7

Much work in the philosophy of psychiatry has mirrored psychopathology by trying to provide a theoretical
account of just what these categories are and how they function. I intend the term ‘diagnostic category’ to
apply very generally, to point out a label’s role in a classificatory scheme without specifying further which
scheme is at play.
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healthy, for example, Guinness World Record holder Scott Flansburg. Scott can mentally
compute mathematical calculations faster than almost any other human. Unlike the rest of
us, he uses his motor cortex to complete these calculations, the part of the brain
responsible for making complex snap decisions such as catching a ball (Flansburg, 2015).
Let’s say Scott fits the hypothetical diagnostic category ‘human calculator syndrome’.
Human calculator syndrome is certainly statistically abnormal, though without making
undue assumptions about his personal life, it seems reasonable to think of Scott as mentally
healthy. If mental disorders are stripped of their normative content, we would owe Allie the
same courtesy as Scott. We would need to withhold judgment about whether or not Allie is
mentally ill after learning that she has MDD. But this is not how these labels typically
function. Indeed it would be difficult to prevent the inference that Allie is unwell. Thus
follows the motivation for stipulating that an individual who fits a diagnostic category has a
mental disorder only if they are mentally ill—if their flourishing is inhibited by their
psychological condition.
Certainly, it is an open question so far whether the list of mental disorders is
identical with the list of conditions that are of interest from a perspective of
psychopathology. If it would be wrong to say that Scott has a mental disorder, how should
we describe him? To avoid confusion, I will use a further piece of terminology ‘typical
deviation’ to describe statistically abnormal psychological conditions which are not
implicated in mental illness. Regardless of whether Allie is healthy or ill, to say that she has
some typical deviation is to classify her as belonging to some interesting category with
respect to her symptoms or their underlying cause, with no normative implications
whatsoever. Though a catalogue of typical deviations would be different from a nosology of
mental disorders, the two taxonomies could mutually inform each other in practice. Still it
is crucial to keep them conceptually separate, as they have different extensions. If the
notion of typical deviation gained a place in public discourse, we would need to take care
that it would not carry normative implications.
I should also preempt one confusion that might follow from certain expectations of
what diagnostic categories are supposed to do. Specifically, it might be thought that, while
‘mental disorder’ is not a natural kind, specific disorders like MDD or their underlying
typical deviations are, such that everyone diagnosed with MDD shares a kind of essence.

8

No part of my project should be construed as relying on this assumption. I agree
with thinkers like Şerife Tekin and Ian Hacking, who stress that mental disorders are
interactive kinds that change in response to their uses by human beings (Hacking, 2006;
Tekin, 2014a; 2014b). As Tekin helpfully summarizes, “the encounter with mental
disorder changes an individual’s self-concept and behavior, and it is not easy—if indeed
possible—to discriminate the influence of diagnosis of mental disorder from that of the
mental disorder itself” (p. 228, 2014a). In other words, a mental disorder like MDD
changes how a subject behaves, both because of changes in brain chemistry, and because
the subject consciously alters her behavior in response to new information gained from the
label itself. These behaviors then get reified as parts of the diagnosis, causing MDD to
change over time. A particularly striking example of this process occurred when an
underfunded hospital in Argentina re-diagnosed its patients—switching from a Kraepelinian
scheme to the DSM standards—in order to work with a French drug company. Overnight,
patients experienced their symptoms in new ways (Lakoff, 2006). As Hacking describes the
case, “such are the mechanisms of cultural imperialism” (Hacking, 2013).8
Tekin suggests that it may be necessary to leave aside the subjective in order to
taxonomize mental disorders (Tekin, 2014b). Murphy agrees, arguing that “psychiatric
diagnoses should be seen as referring to idealizations… that abstract away from the details
of their realization in patients” (p. 105, 2014). Additionally, there may be social reasons to
think of metal disorders as natural kinds. For example to allow patient groups and charities
to form around mental disorders as “distinct and visible brands” (Adam, p. 418, 2013). Of
course, the scientific adequacy of these idealizations rests on our ability to find boundaries
in the structure of the mind that correspond to them. Philosopher Kathryn Tabb calls this
the assumption of diagnostic discrimination, and many recent thinkers, including myself,
are beginning to doubt its value (for more see: Tabb, ms; Friesen, ms; Theuer & Hartner,
2015; Tekin, 2014a & Mallon, ms). For my part, nothing I have to say should turn on the
question of whether that assumption can be vindicated.
One further thing to note about the relationship between mental illness and mental
disorder as I have outlined the terms so far, is that the possibility remains open for

8

See also: Heaton (2013).
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someone to be mentally ill, but not a have a particular mental disorder. That is, an
individual’s flourishing may be inhibited by some psychological feature, without them fitting
a particular diagnostic category. This is a possibility that might be closed, however, by
simply naming the condition. I wish to remain agnostic about the advisability of taking this
route, though many, including myself, tend to think that there are conditions both clinical
and subclinical which, while not mental disorders per se, have very much to do with mental
health. Brain injury, bereavement, and lacking coping skills are just some illustrative
examples.
To recap, I will use these terms in the following ways:
(1) Mental illness—refers to any way of being in which an individual's flourishing is
significantly impaired or limited by some features of their psychology irrespective of
what those features are.
(2) Mental disorder—refers to a psychological condition fitting one or more diagnostic
categories that causes mental illness.
(3) Typical deviation—refers to a psychological condition fitting one or more diagnostic
categories irrespective of whether there is mental illness.
3. An Initial Case for a Two-Stage View
Psychiatry is often conceived of as the study and treatment of mental illness, emotional
disturbance, and some kinds of abnormal behavior. But what is mental illness, in contrast
to physical illness? And what makes a behavior abnormal? These questions have deep
roots in the philosophical literature. I am most interested, however, in the contrast that this
very rudimentary definition sets up: namely that psychiatry is thought of both as a scientific
study and as a practice of treating people. As psychiatrist Lloyd A. Wells puts it in a recent
blog post, good clinical reasoning, “is not a laboratory exercise but one which involves a
doctor, a patient, and the world around them” (Wells, 2014).
Of course, both of these ways of conceiving of psychiatry are crucial to the
discipline, and why they are at odds may not at first be apparent. On one hand, we are in
the nascent stages of discovering facts about the human mind, and psychiatry, as a science,
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ought to be consilient with psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and the other
sciences of the human mind and behavior. As psychiatric research develops, its discoveries
should be grounded in objective facts about the individuals it characterizes. On the other
hand, it is impossible to divorce the study of mental illness from its subjects. Psychiatry is
meant somehow to help those who suffer from mental illness, not just examine and
understand them. It addresses a very urgent and practical problem, the promotion of
mental health and reduction of human suffering and its economic costs.9 So while it is true
that psychiatry must be objective in the above sense, it is also an essentially normative
enterprise. Evaluating patients’ welfare is crucial to improving it. As philosopher of
psychiatry George Graham says, “this is not just because the purpose of medicine is
premised on the disvalue of pain and reduced life expectancy… But it is due to the fact that
the notions of bodily health and physical well-being are evaluative or normative though and
through” (p. 93, 2010).
The evaluative and descriptive sides of psychiatry reveal two goals, to heal and to
explain, which are at once complimentary and competitive.10 To see how they compete,
one need only consider how labor is divided among mental health professionals. Psychiatry
is by its very nature interdisciplinary, and the psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, therapists,
and researchers11 who make up the field have differing levels of investment in healing
versus explaining, as well as differing levels of training in the scientific and practical
knowledge needed to accomplish each goal. It is not well understood what constitutes good
clinical reasoning in any particular context, and mental health professionals’ varying
priorities have so far resulted in varying (and often incommensurable) theoretical
constructs. It is not clear, for example, how a researcher uncovering the neurobiological
mechanisms which regulate serotonin production ought to relate to the diagnostic
categories we are most familiar with in taxonomies like the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), or how a
therapist practicing Freudian psychoanalysis or cognitive behavioral therapy should take on
9

Especially at a time when the World Health Organization estimates that mental and substance use disorders
are the leading cause of disability worldwide, making up 14% of the global burden of disease (2015).
10
Many thanks to Kathryn Tabb and Phoebe Friesen for discussions on this point.
11
To say nothing of the geneticists, neurobiologists, pharmacologists, cognitive scientists, social workers, or
lawyers who specialize in mental health/illness.
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board new discoveries about the role of serotonin. While there have been some attempts
to unify psychiatry’s descriptive and evaluative aspects (for more see: Friesen, ms),
philosophers of psychiatry and other theoreticians have traditionally focused just on one
goal or the other.
Phoebe Friesen is another philosopher of psychiatry interested in the tension
between psychiatry’s evaluative and descriptive goals. In a recent paper she suggests that,
rather than attempt to integrate these goals, theorists should favor an approach which
“encourages an exploratory and open ended approach to ontology within psychiatric
research” (Friesen, ms). Her approach, which she calls ontological pluralism, is an attempt
to provide a workable metaphysics for concepts in psychiatry. She asks theorists to get
comfortable with the idea that, while mental illness is sometimes reducible to underlying
neuropathology, at other times it is best understood by higher level cognitive phenomena
which are not exhaustively constituted by brain states.
While not directly concerned with the metaphysics of mental disorder, my project
is sympathetic to Friesen’s position. Good clinical reasoning must make use of both
descriptive information from the sciences, and evaluative information from our best
normative theories, and this highlights a tension between the arenas of fact and value at play
in psychiatric practice and research. Indeed, when it comes to being scientifically minded
in particular, part of what is interesting in the philosophy of psychiatry is determining just
what psychiatry’s relationship to science is—and what it should be. For while it is generally
agreed that part of scientific respectability is consilience with the other sciences of the mind
and human behavior, the discipline has been less than successful at this task (Murphy,
2006). Psychiatric diagnosis is often guided by prevailing norms and values in spite of
empirical evidence.
To illustrate of psychiatry’s problematic relationship to science, there are clear
historical cases of diagnostic categories which functioned as nothing more than a
pseudoscientific means of institutionalized oppression—some of which are former
diagnoses of the DSM—such as hysteria and homosexuality (Murphy, 2006). These labels
refer to sets of behaviors, irrespective of any underlying, stable, objective entity that is
investigable from the point of view of psychology, biochemistry, or any other medical
science. If we are to take psychiatry seriously as a scientific endeavor, its nosology should
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not merely pathologize counter-normative behaviors, and it should not characterize
individuals as unwell who aren’t. Any discipline which merely enforces cultural norms in
this way, is paternalistic. I will have a good deal more to say about the problem of
paternalism in my second chapter.
For now it is important to note how these cases introduce the worry that psychiatric
practice today is also merely a way of pathologizing unwanted behaviors, and that its
prescriptions do not actually encourage psychological flourishing. In fact, psychiatry’s lack
of success at remaining objective has inspired various forms of antirealism about mental
disorders (Doris & Robins, 2007). But the jump from the worry that particular diagnoses
are fraudulent or politically motivated to the objection that mental disorders are ‘not real’
or have no underlying natural causal explanation is unwarranted. We should take seriously
the idea that there is genuine mental suffering in individuals that can be explained naturally,
whether by recourse to social and environmental facts, or underlying neuropathology, or
both. As philosophers Sarah Robins and John Doris reflect in their review of Psychiatry in

the Scientific Image,
“…examples of prejudice cloaked in pseudo-science are regrettably
common in the history of psychiatric medicine, common enough to
provoke denials that there is such a thing as mental illness (e.g., Szasz 1987).
Yet we embrace such a general skepticism at our peril – and the peril of
those who suffer. Depression, for example, is a widespread and lifethreatening affliction, estimated by the World Health Organization to be
the 4th leading cause of productivity loss worldwide” (Doris & Robins,
2007).
This peril is not to be underestimated. Psychiatry must come to terms with its dual
nature as an empirically grounded science of the mind, and as an evaluative system that
requires a normative theory. The view of clinical psychiatry I am interested in, in this
project, therefore, employs a two-stage methodology. This is a common, and effective
response to psychiatry’s past failures. In short, a two-stage view takes psychiatry’s target to
be those psychological phenomena which cause harm to individuals. On this picture, one
way of specifying the target is by investigating the nature of harm, and another is by
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investigating the nature of the human mind. The tools which are appropriate for one
investigation are not necessarily appropriate for the other, hence the two stages.
One of the strongest reasons for endorsing a two-stage methodology which
separates clinical psychiatry’s descriptive and evaluative projects is that we are not driven to
skepticism about the reality of mental illness (Murphy, 2006; Doris & Robins, 2007). The
two-stage picture allows us to resist a commonly made move from the worry that particular
diagnoses are fraudulent to the objection that psychiatry itself is a non-objective, nonscientific endeavor, and admits a role for clinical psychiatry in bettering lives (Murphy,
2006). It pays due respect to the danger of politically or socially motivated diagnoses while
at the same time endorsing realism.
Further, when psychiatry is grounded in objective facts about the individuals it
characterizes, the possibility for culturally relative norms about what behaviors are and
aren’t desirable to compromise psychiatric practice is limited.
On a two-stage picture, addressing the tension between fact and value gives
psychiatry an open-ended ‘soft-naturalism’ where mental disorder is not a natural kind. As
Murphy explains,

“[m]ental disorder is a concept like pest, weed, or vermin. Weeds and
vermin are not natural kinds, but they are made up of… kinds that can be
explained empirically. Furthermore, whether something counts as a weed or
a vermin depends on human interests in a way that allows the class to grow
over time, or vary across projects… Folk thinking does not determine in
advance whether a species is a pest, nor does it make scientific investigation
of a species of pest into a normative endeavor” (Murphy, p. 98-99, 2006,
italics in original).
A second strength of a two-stage methodology is that its focus on causal etiologies
and consilience with contemporary psychology and cognitive neuroscience gives it a
scientifically reputable methodology. This allows the discipline of psychiatry to be situated
as consilient with the other sciences of the mind such that it can better identify, explain, and
treat mental disorders than its competitors. This may sound obvious to the empirically
minded, but one of the things Murphy demonstrates very well in his book is how lack of
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consideration for the sciences of the mind and human behavior stymies psychiatric
research. As he argues,
“[o]ur current demarcation of mental disorder is scientifically
uninteresting… the superordinate concept of mental disorder, as it stands,
does not pick out a nonarbitrary class. And as well as suggesting that the
conceptual issues need to be reframed, this arbitrariness has scientific
consequences. It can obstruct our ability to generalize across related
conditions, mislead us into thinking that disciplinary boundaries correspond
to an interesting break in nature, and stymie the linkage of psychiatric
research in other disciplines, notably the cognitive sciences” (Murphy, p. 61,
2006).
The controversy surrounding the classification of mental disorders in the DSM is a good
example of the confusion that can result from starting with some folk concept or
pretheoretic intuition about what mental disorders are.12 Consilience with the sciences is
itself an invaluable defense against the pernicious influence of norms of human interest.
Ultimately, these two virtues demonstrate a commitment to good clinical reasoning.
Good clinical reasoning in this sense is thinking about mental illness and mental health
which:
(1) is consilient with the other sciences of the mind/brain, and
(2) employs a normative theory with properly justified evaluative standards for psychiatric
diagnosis.
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Ian Hacking is another philosopher who shares the above concerns about the state of contemporary
psychiatric practice. He is critical of how the diagnoses of the DSM-V systematically overlap symptoms to the
point where they are virtually undifferentiable. In his review of the book Hacking writes, “[t]he DSM is not a
representation of the nature or reality of the varieties of mental illness… it is founded on a wrong appreciation
of the nature of things” (Hacking, 2013). Indeed, a quick glance through the various incarnations of the DSM
makes the business of psychiatric diagnosis seem absurdly ad hoc, heterogeneous, overinclusive, and prone to
the influence of arbitrary social, political, and historical factors. Perhaps it is because the DSM is first and
foremost a document of convenience—the best way of getting clinicians on the same page, or of getting
insurance companies to pay out (First & Westen, 2007). Or perhaps the best explanation lies in the DSM’s
rejection of causal explanation in favor of construct validity, the organizing of mental disorders by statistical
correlations among symptoms (APA, 2013). All of these criticisms have been ably defended. Good clinical
reasoning, in my view, will mark a step away from this classificatory scheme.
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A two-stage picture will be my starting point for what follows.
4. Preview of Primary Chapters
(2) Culturally Unbound: How Cross-Cultural Cognitive Diversity Affects Methodology in
Clinical Psychiatry—My first criteria for good clinical reasoning is that it strictly separates
its descriptive and evaluative projects into two stages, such that notions of typicality do
not delimit the class of mental disorders. To substantiate this, in this chapter I consider
how human psychological variation should affect methodology in two-stage psychiatric
research. I examine recent empirical evidence and develop what I call the CrossCultural Diversity (CCD) picture of the human mind, according to which, variation in
the underlying causal structure of the human mind implies variation in mental illnesses.
I then examine the implications of the CCD view for a discipline which tries to separate
the descriptive from the evaluative in taxonomization of mental disorders, by examining
one methodological proposal given by philosopher Dominic Murphy in his book

Psychiatry in the Scientific Image. I argue that, even in an idealized case, Murphy’s
methodology is hindered by its reliance on a conception of ‘normal human nature’, and
thus does not adequately accommodate cognitive diversity. Next I sketch a promising
way to revise Murphy’s proposed methodology, by examining Grant Ramsey’s recent
work on human nature and his Life-history Trait Cluster (LTC) view. I end with some
notes on how these considerations are beginning to shape inquiry in the form of the
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project.
(3) Individualism as a Solution to Paternalism in Psychiatric Practice—If the goal of
psychiatric practice is to alleviate the suffering caused by mental illness, what kinds of
standards are the right ones to use in determining what counts as mental illness? In this
chapter, I will address the problem of paternalism in psychiatry, the frequent
occurrence of clinical intervention—including diagnosis itself—on the basis of unjustified
standards. Following Daniel Groll’s work on paternalism, I will argue that, in face of
avowals from competent patients that they are not ill, the burden of proof falls on the
clinician to show that a diagnosis is justified. Further, following Valerie Tiberius and
Alexandria Plakias’s discussions of well-being, I will argue that a theory with properly
justified evaluative standards for psychiatric diagnosis must have normative authority. I
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examine how several theories of mental disorder fail to have normative authority, and
conclude that clinical psychiatry must ground what it means to be mentally ill or
mentally healthy in the concerns of individual patients. My second criteria for good
clinical reasoning, therefore, is that it respect variation in what makes individuals
flourish by locating mental health in the concerns of individual patients.
(4) Stewardship of the Mind: How an Ecological Perspective Can Help Us Better
Understand Psychiatric Therapy—Understanding how therapeutic change occurs in
clinical psychiatry depends non-trivially on how we understand human cognition and
human agency. In this chapter I will closely examine what an ecological perspective on
cognition and agency tells us about what has gone wrong in cases of mental illness, and
how successful therapeutic interventions generate change. Briefly, an ecological
perspective casts human beings as stewards of the mind—ecological agents that manage
cognitive ecology. Manifest variation in individual cognitive ecology, then, implies that
there will be variation in the ways we achieve, maintain, and improve mental health.
From this ecological perspective, therapeutic techniques are best conceived of as a
species of agential technologies; a set of often non-obvious methods and strategies of
control, whose pathway of influence over behavior and psychological functioning often
loops outside the boundaries of the skin and skull. My third criteria for good clinical
reasoning, then, is that it take advantage of the unique insights of an ecological
perspective that can help teach us how to be better, mentally.
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2. CULTURALLY UNBOUND:
HOW CROSS-CULTURAL COGNITIVE DIVERSITY AFFECTS
METHODOLOGY IN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY

1. Is Human Nature Messy?
It is now taken for granted in many circles that substantial psychological variability exists
across human populations; we don’t merely differ in the ways we behave, but in the ways

we think, as well. Though versions of this view have been around for some time,
1

Joe Henrich, Steven Heine, and Ara Norenzayan’s 2010 paper, ‘The Weirdest People in

the World?’ has had an exciting and catalyzing impact on the field, getting researchers
involved in discussions of human nature to take cross-cultural cognitive diversity seriously.
Reviewing a broad selection of comparative studies from across the behavioral sciences, in
social psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and neuroscience,
Henrich et al. catalogue substantial evidence of population level psychological variation in
humans—which is all the more surprising because the database of cross-cultural studies is at
this point quite narrow. Further, Henrich et al. show that while behavioral scientists rely
disproportionately on subjects from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic (WEIRD) societies, these WEIRD subjects “are among the least
representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans” (p. 61, Henrich
et al., 2010).
I would like to thank the members of the Moral Psychology Research Group and the audience at the 2014
SSPP, as well as Dominic Murphy and Rob Wilson for feedback on earlier presentations of this material.
1
Not least since early interest in ‘cultural relativism’ in cultural psychology and anthropology. But here I’m
thinking of more recent work such as Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd’s views on gene-culture coevolution,
Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s many contributions to anthropology and social psychology, and Stephen
Stich’s work on cross cultural differences in philosophical intuition. These are all great examples of this trend
in the human behavioral sciences, and the effort to get clearer about the nature, scope, and source of human
psychological variation. For more, see Nisbett & Cohen (1996), Nisbett (2003), Boyd & Richerson (2005),
and Stich (2010).
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Clinical psychiatry is just one discipline that has a stake in our evolving
understanding of psychological variability. What is and isn’t a part of human nature and
just how much psychological variation is included in our notion of human nature will have
a significant impact on how we conceive of, investigate, and treat mental disorders. Indeed,
researchers and clinicians have been grappling with this issue at least since the advent of
‘cultural psychiatry’ in the early 1960s.
2

Even so, for much of this time, many empirically oriented philosophers of mind

thought there to be a fairly large common core of human psychology that was relatively
stable and invariant across cultures.3 This was the dominant view of the mind in the late
nineties in evolutionary psychology, a picture which has been inherited by many
contemporary, scientifically minded views of psychiatry.
In this paper I am interested in how the emerging view of human psychological
nature, which I’ll call the Cross-Cultural Diversity (CCD) view, should in turn affect clinical
psychiatry. In particular, I want to begin to think about what the implications are for the
discipline when we take Henrich at al.’s paradigm of human psychological variation to be
correct. I will work from Dominic Murphy’s account of scientific psychiatry in his 2006
book Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, focusing on the methodology he prescribes for
investigation in psychopathology. I’ve chosen Murphy’s account as my starting place
because he has done the most to articulate and defend a view shared by philosophers
interested in scientifically-minded psychiatric research which employs a two-stage
methodology. I will ask whether Murphy’s account of the two-stage picture has the tools to
accommodate what we now know about human psychological variation.

Most recently, the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) struck the concept ‘culture bound syndrome’ from its pages in the 5th edition (after it was
2

added just one edition before) (APA, 2013). As a project which rejects causal explanation as a way to ground
mental disorders, talk of culture in the DSM has tended to focus on how human culture shapes the context of
mental disorders, their expression, and how they may be competently treated. Little attention has been paid
to the implications of the kind of underlying, cross-cultural cognitive diversity sketched by Henrich et al., just
as little has been paid to consilience with the other sciences of the mind and brain.
3
I’m thinking here of the pervasive influence of the massive modularity hypothesis in the past few decades.
This line of thought emerged after the publication of philosopher Jerry Fodor’s 1983 book The Modularity
of Mind made a substantial impact on thinkers in Evolutionary Psychology such as John Tooby and Leda
Cosmides (1992), Dan Sperber (1994; 2002), and Stephen Pinker (1997). Massive modularity has received its
most sustained and powerful defense in Peter Carruther’s 2006 book, The Architecture of the Mind.
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Addressing this question will require elaboration on two points. First, I’ll say more
about Murphy’s account of the two-stage picture, including a working example of how a
mental disorder is identified. Second, to develop the CCD view, I will draw a number of
‘lessons’ from the work of Henrich et al. and other’s interested in cognitive diversity. My
main contention with Murphy’s account is that it fails to adequately accommodate these
lessons. Shaping these two pieces will be the work of the remainder of this section, in 1.1
and 1.2 respectively.
In section two, I will highlight a particular weakness in Murphy’s account which I’ll
call the variant mechanisms problem. I will argue that, even in an idealized case, its
methodology cannot adequately accommodate cognitive diversity, because of its reliance on
a notion of ‘normal human nature’ which does not square with evidence of psychological
variation across cultures. As a result of this—even at its most responsible—a program of
psychiatric research along the lines of Murphy’s account will generate an impoverished
nosology of mental disorders. Even so, the two-stage picture retains many theoretical and
methodological virtues over its competitors.4 For this reason, I think there is good
motivation to retool the two-stage picture, rather than give up on it entirely.
In section three I will consider two strategies for modifying Murphy’s account:
expanding the notion of human nature at work in the two-stage picture, and rejecting it
entirely as a guide to what is and isn’t mental a disorder. I argue that the later strategy is the
preferable option. Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts on how this debate is taking
shape in current research.
1.1 Murphy's Account
Murphy conceives of psychopathology, the science of psychiatry that investigates and
delineates mental disorders, as “the study of failures of normal human nature” (Murphy, p.
11, 2006). In his book, he is concerned with articulating a view where the notion of mental
disorder is not grounded in folk conceptions or existing disciplinary conventions, arguing
that these things can compromise the objectivity of a nosology (Murphy, 2006). Take for
example the case of drapetomania, as described by the American physician Samuel
4

For more on this refer to my arguments in the introductory chapter.
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Cartwright in 1851, a condition that causes black slaves to flee captivity. This powerfully
illustrates how disciplinary conventions are often fashioned in response to culturally relative
norms and conventions about what behaviors are and are not desirable, thereby enforcing
those norms and characterizing individuals as unwell who aren’t.
As long as the notion of disorder at work in contemporary psychiatry is tangled in
existing disciplinary conventions such that what Murphy calls ‘norms of human interest’
determine the class of mental disorders in advance of scientific investigation,
psychopathology will not, as the saying goes, cut nature at its joints. To combat this kind of
pseudoscience, Murphy argues, mental disorders should be understood as real entities with
discoverable causal etiologies of which it is the purview of the social sciences and the
sciences of the mind to discover and delineate (2006). This view of mental disorder is
common among contemporary theorists, and of the sort I am interested in analyzing here.
The methodology for psychopathology that Murphy describes in his book makes
room for just this kind of objectivity. Rather than going around looking for people who
exhibit behaviors which are already considered undesirable and letting this determine what
mental disorders are, researchers let scientific investigation into human minds lead inquiry
into the concept of mental disorder. Inquiry literally happens in two stages, the first
descriptive, and the second evaluative. This way, “classification of mental illness [groups]
symptoms into conditions based on the causal structure of the abnormal mind” (Murphy,
p. 11, 2006). On Murphy’s picture, mental disorders are to be grounded in objective facts
about the individuals they characterize, including both sociocultural facts and facts that
make recourse to underlying neuropathology.
Ideally, the two stages mediate a realm of positive fact within which science
operates, and a separate but equally real realm of moral and social evaluation within which
conceptions of human flourishing have a home. This keeps the sciences “at a distance from
the various non-scientific projects we otherwise wish to engage in”, and allows us to resist
the worry that clinical psychiatry is in the business of enforcing culturally relative behavioral
norms under the guise of objective scientific practice (Murphy, p. 103, 2006). At the same
time, because our evaluative concepts still play a role, the cognitive and neurosciences do
not have the final say in how we think of mental disorder in practical and social arenas.
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According to Murphy, the ideal two-stage methodology should work in the
following way: First, researchers identify and taxonomize cognitive breakdowns that prevent
individuals from being within the ‘normal range’ of function for a particular cognitive
mechanism (Murphy, 2006). That is, they search for psychological conditions manifesting
patterns that are atypical with respect to how one or more pieces of cognitive architecture
functions for human beings. They then hand over this objective menu of conditions to
various therapists, lawyers, social workers, and ethicists who refer to it in the course of their
respective normatively informed projects. This second group of researchers supplies some
normative considerations in order to decide which breakdowns count as mental disorders
and belong in the nosology.5 In this way, norms of human interest do not determine the
class of mental disorders in advance—as a result of which, drapetomania would never enter
Murphy’s nosology, as it refers to a set of behaviors irrespective of any underlying objective
entity investigable by the sciences. Notice also, that the resulting nosology is not governed
by uniquely neuroscientific considerations. The classic example, a condition called

gourmand’s syndrome which causes ‘excessive’ interest in fine dining, may be interesting
because its underlying cause is a brain lesion, but it is unclear whether it should be
considered a mental disorder.
Murphy considers scientific investigation into mental breakdowns to be a nonnormative enterprise, or at least normative in a ‘weak and unproblematic’ sense, as it does
not appeal to norms of human interest (Murphy, 2006). The sense of normativity here is
statistical, revealing ‘natural norms’ rather than evaluative or justificatory norms of human
interest. Murphy expects that for each cognitive mechanism there will be some
generalization about the role it tends to play in a larger system, and that role will determine
the natural boundaries within which that mechanism ought to operate. Says Murphy, “[m]y
hope is that a combination of causal and statistical reasoning can go some way toward
settling where the boundaries are” (Murphy, p. 349, 2006).
5

In the service of keeping the two stages separate I am going to use these terms in a strict manner, with
‘mental disorder’ and ‘nosology’ referring to the output at stage two, and ‘norms of human interest’ to the
cultural conventions and theoretic commitments of stage two’s evaluative project. ‘Breakdown’, ‘taxonomy’,
and ‘naturalized norms’ will refer exclusively to the output and concepts in stage one. This should align with
usages in rest of my project. Murphy is not careful about these distinctions, as his project is very much
focused on stage one, and issues in the philosophy of science such as the ontological status of mental
disorders and what explanatory role they play.
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Murphy is generally optimistic about the mechanistic tractability of human
psychology and the success of further research in the cognitive sciences. Sharing this
optimism—by taking on the assumption that human psychology is for the most part
mechanistically tractable, and that research in the sciences of the mind will be productive
and informative—is the main respect in which I’m considering an idealized version of
Murphy’s program.6
To make this a bit more concrete, consider how a diagnosis like Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) would enter the nosology of mental disorders on
Murphy’s account. First, researchers pick out an individual who exhibits noteworthy
behavioral, biological, or neurological symptoms, say, little Calvin from Bill Watterson’s

Calvin and Hobbes. Calvin serves as an exemplar. At stage one, scientists discover the
causal etiology of these symptoms and trace them to the underlying structure which is their
cause. In other words, they do cognitive neuroscience. Perhaps in Calvin’s case, they
identify mechanism A, which is responsible for managing attention. If this underlying
structure is mechanistically tractable, and if it is a shared aspect of human psychology (a
part of human nature), and if that mechanism is functioning abnormally (outside of its
normal range), then a breakdown has been identified in Calvin. Finally, the researchers
build a model of this breakdown, generalizing from the features of Calvin which cause the
abnormal function, and add it to the taxonomy of breakdowns. Notice that every step
described so far takes place in stage one. Indeed, it is unknown whether ADHD is a
mental disorder until further normative input is supplied from stage two.7
In order to be successful, Murphy’s account will need a principled way to capture
the panoply of illnesses that cause human beings to suffer, and this reveals an unanswered
question about how stage one researchers should proceed. We may grant that some
combination of causal and statistical reasoning will show when a particular cognitive
mechanism is functioning in an atypical way, but which atypicalities in human psychology
are interesting from the perspective of psychiatric research, and which mechanisms are
6

Of course, this idealization overlooks the possibility that much of our cognition may not be decomposable
into discrete mechanisms in the way Murphy’s theory would require. Murphy recognizes this possibility, and
dismisses it with the quip ‘human nature is messy’ (Murphy, 2006).
7
Because he is mainly interested in stage one, the normative stage of determining what counts as a mental
disorder is largely ignored in Murphy’s book, to the detriment of the theory. It remains to us to think critically
about the second stage, and how the two stages of scientific psychiatry are supposed to interact.
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parts of human nature? For Murphy’s account to work, researchers will need to know, at
stage one, certain facts about mechanisms of attention, and mechanism A in particular.
Namely, is mechanism A shared or common to most humans across different

demographics? Is mechanism A, the way it functions in Calvin, a part of human nature?
It is quite clear that Murphy’s project depends on there being some empirically
useful notion of human nature, but less clear what notion he’s relying on in Psychiatry and

the Scientific Image. His talk of ‘normal human nature’ is vague at least partially because he
is not concerned with giving an account of human nature in his book. Whatever the details
of the right account of human nature are, Murphy seems to think they can be worked out
elsewhere, arguing that, “[i]t is quite correct that we will not be able to explain everything
about people without using culturally specific, and indeed biographically specific,
information. But that does not mean that no interesting generalizations can be formed that
cross cultures” (Murphy, p. 148, 2006).
That there are at least some cross-cultural generalizations to be made about human
psychology which are of interest from the standpoint of psychiatry seems likely. Whether
these generalizations will allow us to demarcate clear disease categories is another matter. I
agree with Murphy that it is too soon to give up on a science of human psychological
nature, and will have more to say soon about what I think that science might look like, but
for now it is interesting to note a few details about how Murphy himself is conceiving of the
subject. First, he relies heavily on the term ‘generalization.’ Second, crucially, because the
sense of ‘abnormality’ in stage one is statistical, without input from stage two, the most we
can say about a breakdown is that it rises to the level of interest necessary for being

considered as a mental disorder. On Murphy’s picture, there is nothing evaluatively
normative about exhibiting or not exhibiting a breakdown.
Human nature, for Murphy, functions as a statistical standard for identifying
breakdowns. If ADHD is modeled as a breakdown, it will only be if mechanism A is in fact
a part of human nature. The normal distribution curve that describes how mechanism A
usually functions gives us a guide for forming a generalization that can be said to be a part
of human nature, such as ‘mechanism A manages attention in humans in such and such a
way’. When an individual falls on the tail-end of that curve—or when their cognitive
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mechanism is operating outside of its normal functional range—they can be said to exhibit a
failure of normal human nature in virtue of statistical abnormality.
There are two important features of human nature, then, that Murphy’s picture
requires. First, non-essentialism; properties which are parts of human nature should be
described by true generalizations.8 Second, non-normativity; these generalizations should
not describe necessary and sufficient conditions for being included as a member of the
human species. To my mind, there are two good candidates of naturalistic interpretations
of human nature which have arisen in recent debate that might fit these criteria, Edouard
Machery’s (2008) nomological notion of human nature, and Richard Samuels’
Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of human nature (2012).9
Consider first Machery’s nomological notion. The nomological notion is a
scientifically useful notion which acknowledges and accommodates our manifest variability
and adaptive plasticity, by denying that the properties that make up human nature are
strictly universal, and that there is anything right or wrong in having them (Cashdan, 2013;
Machery, 2008). According to Machery, “human nature is the set of properties that
humans tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their species … the fact that many
generalizations can be made about humans explains in which sense there is a human
nature” (Machery, p. 232, 2008). On this way of thinking, walking on two legs is a part of
human nature. On the HPC account, by contrast, human nature consists of the cluster of
causal properties or mechanisms which explain “[t]he more readily observable, reliably
occurring generalizations that hold of human beings” (p. 25, 2012). Whatever set of
biological mechanisms that explains why a generalization like ‘humans walk on two legs’ is
true, is a part of human nature on Samuels’ view.
The nomological notion and the HPC account both meet the criteria of nonessentialism. Indeed, both views were designed in response to empirical problems with
essentialist accounts of human nature. But they differ with respect to the second criteria of
non-normativity. To see why, consider Olympic sprint runner Oscar Pistorius, whose legs
8

In this sense, ‘humans walk on two legs’ is a true generalization about humans. Walking on two legs is a
property that most (not all) humans share. This should rule out Sarah Jane Leslie-style striking property
generics like ‘birds lay eggs’ since of course, this is true of less than half of birds (for more see: Leslie, 2007).
9
In fact, Samuels account has been taken up in a theory of psychiatric kinds recently developed by Kenneth
Kendler, Peter Zachar, and Carl Craver (2011).
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were amputated below the knee when he was eleven months old. Both the nomological
notion and the HPC account grant that, despite not having two legs in the usual sense,
Oscar is indeed a member of the human species. Neither is in the business of giving
necessary or sufficient conditions for being human. However because Oscar does not
possess the mechanism that makes ‘humans walk on two legs’ true, Samuels must conclude
that there is something abnormal about Oscar. The HPC account implies that there is
something wrong with Oscar in virtue of his not having legs (Samuels, 2012). There is no
such implication for the nomological notion, as whether or not a particular individual
possesses a property of human nature is of no consequence. As Machery describes it,
“human nature is not normative. There is nothing wrong in not having the properties that
are part of human nature” (Machery, p. 324, 2008). To my mind therefore, nomological
notion provides the most charitable interpretation of Murphy’s usage of ‘normal human
nature’ in his book. It will be helpful to keep this in mind as I describe the Cross-Cultural
Diversity view of human psychological nature in the next part of this section.
1.2 Lessons of Cognitive Diversity
A picture is beginning to emerge from recent empirical evidence that, to the extent there is
a core of human psychological nature, this core is much smaller than was thought even
fifteen years ago. Today, in the work of Henrich et al. and others, much more emphasis is
put on the environment, culture, and cultural variation, than is put on innateness and
invariance. The following four ‘lessons’ I’ve drawn from Henrich et al.’s work typify a
recent trend of research sensitive to diversity in human cognition. They bear directly on
current thinking about human nature, and are the kinds of claims which any view that
aspires to take cognitive diversity seriously ought to be able to accommodate.
(1) There is an astounding amount of population level variation—Comparative studies in
social psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and neuroscience
have revealed evidence of population level variation in self-concepts, norms of fairness
and cooperation, folk-biological reasoning, spatial reasoning, representing integer
amounts, the visual system including color perception and susceptibility to visual
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illusions,10 motor development (Karasik et al., 2010), philosophic intuition (Stich, 1998;
2010), physiological response to insult (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), susceptibility to biases
such as self-serving and self-effacing biases, situation and attention biases, and hindsight
biases (Nisbett, 2003), as a partial list.
(2) Much is likely due to variability in contingent, social and ecological conditions rather

than genetic variability—While Henrich et al. cite many possible explanations for the
existence of population level variation (Henrich, 2010), the growing consensus seems to
be that our behavioral variation is for the most part traceable to our uniquely human
adaptive plasticity (Panchanathan, 2010). There are two main ways of understanding
what this adaptive plasticity amounts to. In the tradition of Peter Richerson and Robert
Boyd’s work on cultural evolution, human beings may have evolved “[n]umerous
domain-specific mechanisms that are designed to interact with the cultural, social, and
ecological environment to produce locally adaptive phenotypes” (Henrich et al., p. 102,
2010; see also: Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Machery, 2010; Fessler & Machery, 2012).
This view has much in common with the nativist and modularity hypotheses in the
philosophy of mind (see: Carruthers, 2006). An opposing, but not strictly incompatible
thesis in the tradition of Kim Sterelny’s work on ecological niche construction posits
that our cognitive architecture is for the most part constituted by domain-general
mechanisms which allow us to absorb, through learning and cultural transmission,
vastly different psychological processes, traits, or capacities (Sterelny, 2003; 2012;
Machery, 2010). Each explanatory model seems to agree that we are comprised of
some combination of domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms; the points of
contention are rather how much of our cognition is innate and how much is learned,
and how much is domain-general or domain-specific. No matter how this score is
settled, the common point is that differing environments can cause vastly different
developmental trajectories.11 Each rejects what Rob Wilson calls the External

10

For a fuller bibliographic listing of the relevant studies see Henrich et al. (2010).
If the point here was simply that our external environments play a role in development and shaping our
psychologies, it would be rather trivial. But these lessons present a methodological problem for research in
the human behavioral sciences, especially when evaluative concepts come into play!
11
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Minimalism Thesis, that “[s]tructures and processes external to an individual play at
best a secondary causal role in…development” (p. 15, 2004).12
(3) The prevalence of variation is reflective of differing minds—The diversity in question
here is cognitive diversity. Whether caused by domain-general mechanisms or domainspecific mechanisms, genuine underlying psychological differences across populations
explain the prevalence of behavioral variation. Put another way, human adults from
different cultures and environments have different minds. Humans don’t just act
differently, we think differently, too. This is quite significant, though what effect it will
have for psychiatric diagnosis depends on how much of the variation each explanatory
model accounts for. Whatever the case, our shared psychological endowment is
certainly less substantial than has traditionally been assumed by behavioral scientists.
(4) It is difficult to disentangle innately shared aspects of human psychology from

developmentally, culturally, or environmentally contingent aspects —Because of our
13

adaptive and developmental plasticity, and because of the variance among our cognitive
mechanisms, there is a methodological difficulty for human behavioral research. It is
hard to find data that show that a particular behavior found in a particular population
can be found across populations. It is even harder to discover what mechanism drives
that behavior, whether that mechanism is common to all humans, and whether it
operates in reliably similar ways across contexts. All these things matter when
determining truths about the human mind. Yet despite the narrow sample size, and the
status of WEIRD subjects as outliers, “behavioral scientists are often interested in
drawing inferences [from WEIRD populations] about the human mind and human
behavior… This lack of epistemic vigilance underscores the prevalent, though implicit
assumption that the findings one derives from a particular sample will generalize
broadly” (Henrich et al., p. 63, 2010; italics in original).

12

For more on the relationship between nativism and modularity across the sciences, see Wilson’s

Boundaries of the Mind (2004).
13

“developmentally, culturally, or environmentally contingent aspects” is Henrich et al.’s phrasing (p. 63,
2010).
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2. The Variant Mechanisms Problem
My objection to the methodology that Murphy outlines is that its reliance on ‘normal
human nature’ does not adequately address the facts described by Henrich et al.’s lessons.
The best way to understand the variant mechanisms problem may be to first outline an
objection against Murphy that I think fails to get off the ground.
2.1 Rejecting the Exemplar Objection
Symptoms of mental illness are one type of behavior which we should expect to exhibit
population level variation, and we do not in general expect that all of our psychiatric
categories will be universally applicable. Considering this might lead one to worry that the
real problem with Murphy’s view is the very process by which psychiatric diagnoses enter
the nosology; that scientific psychiatry’s methodology biases psychiatric theory building in
unacceptable ways, because it proceeds by relying on exemplars of this or that failure of a
cognitive mechanism to populate the list of mental breakdowns that make up our
taxonomy. Call this the exemplar objection.
The exemplar objection notes that on Murphy’s picture, if a disorder has been
successfully modeled, then the underlying computational structure it is based in is, by fiat,
common to most humans. In actual practice, Western researchers tend to look only into
exemplars and conditions that are salient to them. Other times, budget considerations limit
research to subjects that are practically within reach. Western researchers are therefore
liable to leave out interesting conditions more common in non-WEIRD populations, and
may even fail to model some prevalent abnormalities in their own niches. This turns the
use of exemplars to guide inquiry into a biasing mechanism. For contingent, and perhaps
ethnocentric reasons, given that the discipline of psychiatry as we know it is mainly a
Western enterprise, we may expect the resulting taxonomy to be incomplete—so says the
exemplar objection.
As Henrich et al. are at pains to point out, this has been a methodological problem
with research in the human sciences all along. With contemporary research in
psychopathology in particular, we have no reason to think that the exemplars we are
familiar with completely represent the ways in which humans might break down. Instead,
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the taxonomy is likely reflective of conditions that afflict our WEIRD exemplars. Those
belonging to the cultural psychiatry movement have often made this complaint about the
DSM in particular. While a few non-WEIRD mental illnesses have caught Westerner’s
attention, such as the startle matching syndrome known as latah in Southeast Asia and
other members of the former ‘culture bound syndrome’ category, it is possible that the
majority of DSM diagnoses are in fact ‘culture bound’ to the United States (Kleinman,
1997).14
The exemplar objection is not a fair criticism of the two-stage view. It fails because
it is unwarranted to saddle an idealization of two-stage methodology with concerns about
psychiatry as it’s currently practiced. A responsible stage one researcher who takes the first
of Henrich et al.’s lessons seriously would make an effort to conduct a great deal of crosscultural research, and generate a more representative collection of models.
2.2 Variant Mechanisms Impoverish the Nosology on Murphy’s Account
Even if we imagine a world in which a smart and responsible group of super-scientists had
unlimited resources at their disposal in order to implement Murphy’s program, there
would still be two very important complications. First, as demonstrated by the fourth
lesson, we have no way of knowing a priori whether the structures that underlie WEIRD
behavioral variants are shared or instantiated in other cultures.15 Upon investigation,
sometimes they’ll be shared, and sometimes they won’t. In other words, the question of
whether some exemplary behavioral variant really is evidence of a breakdown cannot be
settled in advance of the research.
Second, and more importantly, if Henrich et al.’s third lesson is right and it is our
minds themselves and not just our behaviors which differ cross-culturally, we should expect
a ‘rich diversity of functional modes’ when it comes to our cognitive mechanisms—different
minds, different mechanisms (Amundson, 1999). And if we really do vary with respect to

14

Indeed, as cross-cultural research is starting to get more attention (and more resources thanks to efforts like
the Intellectual Humility Project (2013)), the situational embeddedness of symptoms of mental illness
becomes more and more apparent. There is now good evidence to think that hallucinatory voices are shaped
by culture both geographically (Parker, 2014) and across time (Jay, 2013).
15
This may be true of many diagnoses currently deemed widely applicable by the DSM. In many of these
cases, we don’t even know what the underlying structures are.
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our cognitive machinery, then we should expect that the ways in which things go wrong will
vary across populations as well. We should find not just that the way failures of cognitive
mechanisms are expressed in behavior changes from culture to culture, but that the
mechanisms themselves, and therefore the failures, change. Variance in the underlying

causal structure of the human mind implies variance in illnesses. This is the upshot of the
CCD view. Much of the cognitive structure in which characteristically ‘disordered’ behavior
is grounded is liable to be built by culture, or learned from the environment. Thus the
mechanisms in question will vary across ecological niche, and there will be no appropriate
generalizations about them from the perspective of scientific psychiatry.
That there is no way of accommodating this kind of variation on Murphy’s picture
is the basis of the variant mechanisms problem. Because the only conditions that rise to the
level of interest from the standpoint of psychiatry on his construal are those that are
common across cultures—or part of human nature—mechanisms that are not shared are not
eligible to be modeled as breakdowns. Consider for example, the recent mass psychosis
occurring in the village of Kalachi in Kazakhstan, causing almost ten percent of the
population to fall asleep (Hay, 2014). If the underlying cause of this behavior is not a part
of human nature, do these villagers not count as sick? This strikes me as a way of
overpopulating the list of mere ‘problems in living’ and impoverishing our taxonomy,
which is especially problematic from the perspective of a clinician who relies on diagnostic
categories to secure treatment.
When it turns out that the structures picked out in exemplars like Calvin aren’t
shared what should be done? Suppose, as is not unlikely, that mechanism A, which
underlies Calvin’s ADHD, is not widely instantiated across cultures because our ways of
managing attention are culturally learned.16 Perhaps A is the result of a domain-general
mechanism and develops in some niches, but not others, or perhaps it is a domain-specific
mechanism that develops vastly different tendencies in different niches.17 If we ask, has
16

Indeed, there is a suggestive correlation between high rates of ADHD diagnoses and state laws that penalize
schools when they fail to meet the standards set by No Child Left Behind (Miller, 2014).
17
These are two different ways of parsing what ‘shared’ might mean, according to the two explanatory models
outlined earlier. Importantly, both are abhorrent to Murphy’s view, as they severely limit the number of
generalizations that can be drawn about most humans. My sympathies lie with the anti-nativist and antimodularity hypotheses of Sterelny’s view, according to which a good deal of humans’ information processing
structure is not innate and in the head, but external and in the cultural niche. This is important because the
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something gone wrong here? Murphy must reply no. There is no true generalization that
can be made about how this mechanism tends to function in most humans. And the same
goes for any other cognitive mechanism which is unevenly distributed across human
populations, of which there are liable to be many. 18 On his account, these simply won’t
enter the nosology.
The way Murphy has framed it, nothing about any differentially distributed
psychological entity rises to the level of interest necessary for being a mental disorder. The
notion of normal human nature that he relies on generates a taxonomy of breakdowns that
does not adequately accommodate cross-cultural cognitive diversity because it does not
fully capture what is interesting about the way human minds fail. In the hypothetical
ADHD case, the problem Calvin has still seems very much rooted in the malfunction of a
psychological entity. Murphy’s picture, however, is only interested in those mechanisms we
share, and not fully sensitive to the ways we differ.
3. Saving the Two Stages
In which direction do we proceed? What if a taxonomy of breakdowns as composed by
Murphy’s stage one does not capture everything that is interesting about the way human
minds fail? Put another way, what will it take to consider people suffering with symptoms of
ADHD or latah or any other condition to be candidates for disorder without recourse to
norms of human interest? Because if the story told by Henrich et al. is right, humans have
far less in common psychologically than Murphy is likely to need to get his project off the
ground. Can the two-stage view be modified so as to retain the virtues mentioned above,
and still capture what is interesting about the many ways in which human minds can fail?
I hope you share the intuition that the kind of response given by Murphy in the
hypothetical ADHD case is suspect, and not just because we have an interest in patients’
welfare. If you are motivated by this problem, a dilemma seems to emerge: either rethink
human nature, or rethink the two-stage view. Next in 3.1 I will consider the possibility of

problem here may be seen as much worse if it turns out that there is not much at all which is stable or
generalizable about human psychological nature
18
One might also point out a similar difficulty for identifying shared features of human psychology across
times.
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modifying the notion of normal human nature on Murphy’s account. I end up rejecting this
move because it will actually make accommodating the suffering caused by mental illness
even more difficult. In 3.2 I consider the possibility of modifying the two-stage view.
3.1 The First Horn: Expanding Human Nature
After considering the manifest psychological variation revealed by the CCD picture, one
might be tempted to think something like the following: if we really do have different minds

we should expect that we break down in different ways as well. There should be ways of
specifying failures in contingent aspects of human psychology, which are candidates for a
psychiatric nosology, on any adequate account. Is there, then, another way of thinking
about human nature, compatible with the CCD picture, which psychiatry might rely on?
At one point in his book, Murphy suggests that it may be acceptable to sort people
into classes, and specify a range of normal properties for each class. For example, the eyes
of babies, elderly people, and adults have different functional tendencies, and expectations
for what is statistically normal reflect this fact (Murphy, 2006). If the nomological notion of
human nature is expanded to include properties that belong to some subsets of humans, it
would grant researchers the ability to specify failures in contingent aspects of human
psychology in a natural way. For instance, we would be able to narrow the domain for our
generalization about Calvin’s mechanism A, perhaps specifying that it tends to develop a
certain way in the East and another way in the West. Using this modified notion, if Calvin’s
mechanism A is statistically abnormal with respect to the normal functional range for
Westerners, then it is evidence of a breakdown.
Whether this is an acceptable move in part depends on whether relativized
properties are proper parts of nomological human nature. Machery himself emphatically
argues that they are not. In a 2012 response to Tim Lewens, Machery defends what he calls
the universality proposal, his claim that only those generalizations that hold for most
humans are properties of human nature. If we relax this proposal and include properties
relativized across age groups or biological sexes, he reasons, then why not include
properties relativized across small subcultures or kin groups? Machery argues that the
resulting notion is absurdly arbitrary since it is too inclusive (Machery, 2012).
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I will have more to say on what makes a notion of human nature scientifically useful
in the next section. Regardless, it is clear that rejecting the universality proposal will have
disastrous consequences for a two-stage methodology as Murphy has outlined it.
Remember that Murphy’s original motivation for using a notion of human nature to
determine what counts as a breakdown in stage one was to prevent pseudoscientific
diagnoses like drapetomania from entering the nosology (Murphy, 2006). This is still vitally
important.
Suppose that you are handed a culturally relativized taxonomy of breakdowns and
asked which count as mental disorders. What reason would there be for claiming, in an
evaluative sense, that Japanese people ought to think Japanese and Paraguayan people
ought to think Paraguayan?! If we make the move from thinking that it is statistically
abnormal for people raised in a certain cultural context to have certain cognitive
mechanisms, to thinking that it is necessarily disordered for them to have those
mechanisms, the ugly specter of paternalism rises, such that psychiatric diagnoses are made
based on unjustified evaluative standards. Imagine other explanations of this form—your

mind should be shaped this way because you’re a woman, because you grew up poor, etc.
Quite plausibly, no relativized breakdowns would ever go on to be considered disordered
at stage two. This supposed fix for scientific psychiatry has actually made Murphy’s
problem worse, and for these reasons the first horn of our dilemma should be ruled out.
Before moving to the second horn of the dilemma, I would like to consider one
further objection. Namely, that one way to avoid the difficulties I have proposed is by
denying that they are there. It might be argued that, despite our manifest psychological
diversity, the generalizations that can be drawn are enough for Murphy’s program to
capture what is interesting about mental illness. In order for this to work, when there is
evidence of cross-cultural variation, researchers must abstract away from those differences
in order to make an appropriate generalization which is a property of normal human
nature. So for example, if we do not all share the same visual system, then researchers
abstract away from the properties of those systems that make us differ until it can be said
that we do. If moving up a level of abstraction is not possible, researchers might instead
identify the shared developmental mechanism responsible for the phenotype in question.
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So though we may have wildly different, culturally transmitted mechanisms managing
attention, we may have a shared mechanism for acquiring them.19
Perhaps, so described, these mechanisms will be operating outside of their normal
range in our exemplars, and perhaps not. Of course, this is an empirical question. But I
would like to sound a note of caution—for both of these strategies, loss of detail makes it
more likely that the appropriately specified psychological system is functioning within its
normal range in our exemplars.20 Further, my worry about relativized properties still applies
here. Claiming that it is a part of human nature for a developmental mechanism to produce
several different functional attention systems in different environments does not answer the
question of whether Calvin’s behavior is causing him harm.
3.2 The Second Horn: Rejecting the Search for ‘Breakdowns’
Before suggesting how the two-stage view might be modified, I want to stress that it need
not (indeed, ought not) be rejected entirely by, for example, building a normative theory
for what counts as disorder into the science of psychopathology, or rejecting the idea that
there are such things as mental disorders altogether. Though this is not the place to fully
defend the two-stage view of clinical psychiatry, it is worth recalling some of its virtues:
realism about mental disorders, a scientifically reputable methodology, and its use as a
critical tool to keep paternalistic diagnoses like drapetomania out of a nosology of mental
disorders. Separating psychiatry’s descriptive and evaluative projects is both an empirical
benefit and a defense against the pernicious influence of norms of human interest.
Of course, one precondition for the practicality of the separation of fact and value
the way Murphy would have it is the ‘common core’ picture of the mind that he inherited.
In defending his account, especially his use of normal human nature to ground failures in
cognitive mechanisms, there is an underlying assumption that stage one researchers can get
a lot of work done in the lab before allowing norms of human interest to enter the picture.
19

Many thanks to Eli Shupe for interesting and fruitful discussion on this point.
I think part of the temptation of this view comes from the apparent success of pharmaceutical tools to
mitigate psychiatric problems. I am not denying that psychoactive drugs can be good clinical solutions, but
these chemicals (antidepressants, stimulants, antipsychotics, mood stabilizers etc.) solve both very general
problems and a very diverse set of problems. In many cases, in current practice, it is like using a
sledgehammer where a scalpel will do, neatly stepping around the question of which diagnoses necessarily
applies to the patient.
20
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Because the core of human psychological nature is large enough, the thinking goes, fact
and value can be separated such that researchers will not have to prejudge which
‘malfunctions’ or ‘failures’ in human psychological nature are mental disorders, and which
are not. As I have argued, this will simply not be possible if the CCD picture is right,
because much of what is interesting for clinical psychiatry falls outside the boundaries of
the common core.
My suggestion is as follows: to achieve strict separation of psychiatry’s descriptive
and normative projects, stage one researchers should simply catalogue human cognitive
mechanisms, to what extent they are universal or culturally acquired, how they operate, and
under what conditions. One immediate worry is methodological. Perhaps a taxonomy of
this kind will somehow not be ‘enough’ for a normative theory of mental disorder at stage
two to work with. This worry strikes me as unwarranted. I believe that the two-stage view’s
difficulties with cross-cultural cognitive diversity can be solved by thinking critically about
how the two stages are supposed to interact. On my view, the second stage of clinical
psychiatry does not require a taxonomy of breakdowns from the first stage.
If this new methodology can be vindicated, it will provide theorists and clinicians
two great advantages. First, what is and is not true of most human beings need not have an
influence on a stage one research program. Instead of worrying about where to draw the
line between normal and abnormal, stage one researchers can draw bell curves and
population frequencies without making assumptions about what we should expect to find in
any one individual’s head—in virtue of their being human, or for that matter from Chicago’s
south side. Second, by reinforcing a strict boundary between the descriptive and evaluative
in two-stage psychiatry, we may reexamine whether and how a concept of human nature is
useful in thinking about mental disorder. Even if it cannot differentiate mental illness from
mental health, statistical atypicality could provide us with other kinds of information from
the perspective of clinical psychiatry.
There are two tasks left ahead, then: to show that a stage one that does not
delineate breakdowns is methodologically sufficient for a two-stage program, and to
elaborate on how facts about human variation are useful for the discipline. Happily, the
second task may shed light on the first. In the remainder of this section, I will return to the
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question of Machery’s universality proposal, examine its implications for defining the target
of scientific research.

3.2.1 The Life-History Trait Cluster View
In a recent paper, Grant Ramsey identifies three desiderata for a non-essentialist notion of
human nature. He argues that the concept should,
(D1) be the empirically accessible (and thus not based on occult essences) subject of the
human (psychological, anthropological, economic, biological, etc.) sciences,
(D2) help clarify related concepts like innateness and naturalness, which are associated with
human nature, and
(D3) characterize human uniqueness (Ramsey, 2014).
According to Ramsey’s view, which he formulates as a direct competitor to Machery’s
nomological notion, the human sciences ought to investigate associations between
antecedent and consequent traits among all possible human life histories. The statistical
trends we uncover are properties of human nature on this view, which he calls the Lifehistory Trait Cluster (LTC) account.
The LTC notion of human nature construes what it means to ‘behave naturally’ in
a relative way, where “[i]nstead of saying that it is natural to C, we should instead say that it
is natural for As to C where ‘A’ denotes the antecedent(s) and ‘C’ denotes the consequent”
(Ramsey, p. 990, 2014). For example, ‘lactation in females is a part of human nature’ would
be an appropriate claim on the LTC account, relating the antecedent trait ‘being female’ to
the consequent trait ‘lactation’. Says Ramsey, “[i]f there is to be an empirically-accessible
human nature that sheds troubling essentialisms, then it should be founded on the unique
pattern of traits within the collective human life histories” (Ramsey, p. 992, 2014).
Ramsey is quick to note that the LTC account’s embrace of diversity and rejection
of the universality proposal has one counterintuitive consequence, namely that it is as
Machery would fear: incredibly inclusive. He counters that, although it is not unique to
humans, female lactation is surely an important aspect of the human species. Indeed, there
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are countless more trivial associations which are parts of human nature on the LTC
account (for instance between having mass and eventually dying). Ramsey accepts the
inclusion of trivialities, noting that the “[i]nteresting [associations] often occur when the
antecedent is not universal, and when changes in the antecedent are causally associated with
changes in the consequent”, and order to narrow the focus, he defines uniquely human

nature as “the subset of the antecedent-consequent associations that are unique to the
human species” (Ramsey, p. 992, 2014).
On one reading, Machery's concern over a notion of human nature like the one
provided by the LTC account is methodological, questioning whether Ramsey’s account
can satisfy D1. Think of all the associations which are unique to humans because the
antecedent is especially restrictive. If human nature is exactly how humans are, however

they are the thought goes, will it be a useful concept for scientific research? Ramsey
counters that it is actually the nomological notion of human nature which fails to meet D1
as a result of its adherence to the universality proposal, questioning why we should assume
that it is “sameness across individuals that is of interest to scientists, and not their
variation?” (Ramsey, p. 986, 2014). I am in agreement with Ramsey that human diversity is
of crucial scientific interest. Indeed it appears that the seemingly arbitrary mess of
associations that the LTC account identifies is just what the human sciences are
investigating, whether or not the subset that applies universally is of special interest.
On another reading, however, Machery’s concern represents a terminological
disagreement, as in that’s just not what is meant by human nature. I am not much
interested in settling the terminological dispute. What is crucial to recognize here is that
what is universal does not determine what is interesting from the perspective of clinical
psychiatry, so if Machery is right, then human nature is a concept of limited use in thinking
about mental disorder. In fact, as a purely descriptive catalog of trait frequencies in the
human population, the LTC account could be useful for psychiatric diagnosis in particular,
shedding the need to identify breakdowns, and leaving space for stage two to contribute the
evaluative work. Therefore, since both Machery and Ramsey make clear that their notions
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are empirically accessible subjects, we may proceed by thinking of Ramsey’s LTC view as
an account of human diversity, rather than of human nature.21
What is most intriguing about the LTC view and its rejection of the universality
proposal is the possibility that the conditional schema that Ramsey gives may be mapped
onto distinction between symptoms and underlying causes. It is very likely that what we
now call depression, for example, admits of many, causally heterogeneous explanations
which may be more usefully conceived of as separate diagnoses. Understanding the set of
antecedent traits that result in certain symptoms is needed to make more accurate
diagnoses.
A taxonomy of the many and varied components of the mind will also be crucial
for understanding what causal pathways may best ameliorate symptoms for any particular
subject. Whether or not an individual fits a diagnostic category is a different question from
what therapeutic process is most appropriate for that subject, and locally specific
information provided by the LTC account will be central to discovering this. Locally
specific information may also help us make sense of culturally bound syndromes like latah
and ADHD.

3.2.2 The LTC and the RDoC
It may not take much imagination to begin to mold the discipline of psychiatry towards a
two-stage project like the one I have outlined above. The National Institutes of Mental
Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) matrix has much in common with the kind of
purely descriptive taxonomy of cognitive mechanisms which I am envisioning as the ideal
output of stage one. Instead of being organized around current diagnostic categories, the
RDoC is organized according to our best research programs in the sciences of the mind
and brain. Research categories often take the form of symptoms such as ‘hearing voices’ or
capacities such as ‘self-knowledge’. It is intended “as a framework to guide classification of
patients for research studies, not as an immediately useful clinical tool” (NIMH, 2015).

21

Surely Ramsey and his supporters will reject this move, but while it’s clear to me that human variation is
critical to our understanding of ourselves, there is more to be said to support the idea that ‘human nature’ is
the rightful name for either view.
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Perhaps forming a list of diagnostic categories is an implicit goal of psychiatric
research. Murphy and others reject the idea that diagnostic categories can be delimited by
clusters of symptoms as is done with the DSM. I quite agree. Murphy’s search for
breakdowns, then, is motivated by the hope that clear disease categories will fall out of the
search for causal mechanisms. But we have been given no reason thus far to think that this
might be the case, nor that it need be the case—even without the issue of cross-cultural
diversity to contend with. In fact, the assumption that clear disease categories will result
from the search for causal mechanisms is now being questioned by philosophers of
psychiatry. As Kari Theurer and Daniel Hartner note in a recent project, it is looking less
and less likely that those clinically relevant diagnoses we are most familiar with, such as
depression and anxiety, will even be preserved at the level of neurobiological mechanisms
(2015).
The search for breakdowns in stage one is Murphy’s mistake. On my view, theorists
and clinicians will not need lines to be drawn between sickness and heath or normality and
abnormality at stage one because the purpose of a stage two research program is precisely
to supply these kind of normative considerations. This way researchers can refocus their
efforts on “the pursuit of causal mechanisms that can undergird new therapies” (Tabb, ms).
This will involve, as philosopher of psychiatry Kathryn Tabb has recently put it, dropping
the pretense that “psychiatry’s scientific and practical objects are one and the same,” so
that, “the fits and starts of biomedical research need not immediately impact clinical
nosology” (Tabb, ms).
Care must be taken therefore, that we do not use an understanding of human
diversity like that provided by the LTC account to double down on our commitment to the
assumption that conceptually distinct mental disorders will fall out of further work with a
project like the RDoC. Theuer and Hartner warn researchers of this possibility when they
argue that “[p]sychiatry cannot hope to map diagnostically useful categories on to
underlying multilevel mechanisms, no matter how complicated, because psychiatry is
uniquely and precariously situated at the boarder of empirical facts and values” (2015). At
the present time, it is not clear whether the RDoC is committed to keeping conceptual and
methodological distance between the lab and clinic. As the NIMH currently notes,
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“[t]o date, there has been general consensus that the science is not yet well
enough developed to permit neuroscience-based classification. However, at
some point, it is necessary to instantiate such approaches if the field is ever
to reach the point where advances in genomics, pathophysiology, and
behavioral science can inform diagnosis in a meaningful way. RDoC
represents the beginning of such a long-term project” (2015).
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have tried to show two things. First, that Murphy’s account of a two stage
methodology for clinical psychiatry generates a taxonomy of breakdowns that cannot fully
capture what is interesting about mental illness, and that some serious rethinking of its
methodology is in order. Second that the way forward is to recommit ourselves to the
methodological separation of psychiatry’s descriptive and evaluative stages. Avenues for
further research include critical assessment of what place normative concepts like wellbeing and flourishing have in psychiatry, and how they help define the class of mental
disorders. Ultimately, I hope that clear thinking about both stages will lead to clarification
of concepts like mental disorder and diagnostic category.
As I have argued, it is a mistake to think that the sciences of the mind can only be
helpful for psychiatric diagnosis if they can determine what is normal or abnormal. The
first stage of psychiatry is useful not for identifying whether a patient is suffering, but how.
Calvin, his caretakers, and his therapists are best suited to answer the first question. 22 And
when they need to find what therapeutic intervention will best help him, a taxonomy of the
many possible human cognitive mechanisms and their functions seems exactly the place to
look. At this second stage, clinicians may well make use of information regarding the
statistical normality of Calvin’s functioning, in general, or perhaps even relative to a
particular population. Our lack of ability to draw neat lines around mental disorder on
purely statistical grounds should be expected and embraced.

22

I do not mean to imply that there is some sort of priority in time here, such that stage two must happen
before stage one or vice versa. Indeed, if purely descriptive, stage one researchers can act more or less
autonomously from the clinic using a schema like the RDoC.
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3. INDIVIDUALISM AS A SOLUTION TO PATERNALISM IN
PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE

Self-knowledge is a difficult thing. Many have had the experience of knowing that a friend
or partner is in a bad mood before she herself realizes it. Similarly with mental illness, it
seems that a person may be sick without realizing it, or even while denying it outright.
Anosognosia, the lack of awareness that one is mentally ill, is most visible in cases of
dementia or brain damage, but recent insights in psychology have shown that human beings
generally lack accurate introspective awareness in matters of our own well-being.1 Getting
this right—whether or not someone is flourishing psychologically—is crucial in psychiatry,
and self-report cannot always be relied upon.
At the same time, many have been in the unfortunate position of having to defend
themselves from harmful accusations that they are unwell. Take, for example, the early 20th
century pathologization of homosexuality. No doubt there was agreement on some
descriptive facts between psychiatrists and their subjects, but such diagnoses are none the
less inappropriate because the evaluative standards they are based in are unjustified. Any
institution which enforces unjustified evaluative standards is harmful, and depending on
what normative scheme is operative in our schools, prisons, and clinics, we are in danger of
characterizing, and thereby mistreating, individuals as unwell who aren’t. Theorists should
have some principled way to resist what I will call the problem of paternalism in psychiatry,
the frequent occurrence of clinical intervention—including diagnosis itself—which conflicts
with an individual’s psychological flourishing.
In this paper, I will address the problem of paternalism in psychiatry by framing it
in terms of anosognosia. In the first section, I will elaborate on the complexity of

1

For an extended treatment of this, see philosopher Dan Haybron’s excellent book The Pursuit of

Unhappiness (2008).
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paternalism, by situating it in both its philosophical and historical context. Following the
work of Daniel Groll I will argue that, in the face of avowals from competent patients that
they are not ill, the burden of proof falls on the clinician to show that a diagnosis is justified.
In section two, following Valerie Tiberius and Alexandria Plakias’ work on well-being, I will
consider what principles can provide such justification. I will argue that a theory with
properly justified evaluative standards for psychiatric diagnosis must have normative
authority. I consider George Graham’s account of mental disorder in his 2010 book, The

Disordered Mind, and argue that this contemporary account also fails to have normative
authority. Finally in section three I will argue that in order to solve the problem of
paternalism, psychiatry must ground what it means to be mentally ill2 or mentally healthy in
the concerns of individual patients, and consider some objections to this view.
1. The problem of Paternalism
The problem of paternalism in clinical psychiatry has a complex history. Centrally, it
involves whether and how clinicians meet two rather uncontroversial standards in their
reasoning about patients: first, that they be consilient with the other sciences of the mind,
and second, that they use justified evaluative standards for psychiatric diagnosis.
Historically, many different evaluative standards have been employed in diagnosing mental
disorders, and not all standards have successfully captured only true cases of mental illness.
To understand the problem of paternalism in psychiatry, then, one must bring together
several threads. First, in 1.1 I will consider, generally, what makes an action paternalist.
Then in 1.2 I will consider the harms involved in psychiatric diagnosis, especially
inaccurate diagnosis. In 1.3 then, I will be able to articulate what makes paternalist action in
clinical psychiatry especially problematic. Finally in 1.4, I will illustrate how the problem of

2

Following work in earlier chapters, these terms will be used in the following ways for clarificatory purposes:

mental illness refers to any way of being in which an individual's flourishing is significantly impaired or limited
by some features of their psychology irrespective of what those features are, mental disorder refers to a
psychological condition fitting one or more diagnostic categories that causes mental illness, and typical
deviation refers to a psychological condition fitting one or more diagnostic categories irrespective of whether
there is mental illness. To my mind, the interesting question here is the question of whether or not a patient
knows they are mentally ill, though most theorists frame this in terms of disorder—of course, disorder implies
illness but not vice-versa.
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paternalism arises in contemporary theorizing about mental disorder, using two
hypothetical examples.
1.1 First Pass: What Makes an Action Paternalist?
In his article on the subject, philosopher Daniel Groll suggests that the concept of
paternalism in medicine is best seen as a conflict between two principles central to modern
medical ethics. As he summarizes,
“[t]he principle of beneficence (henceforth the ‘beneficence principle’)
enjoins clinicians to act in ways that are ultimately good for the patients in
their charge. The second central principle of medical ethics is that of
respect for autonomy (henceforth the ‘autonomy principle’), which enjoins
clinicians to, unsurprisingly, respect the autonomy of their patients. This
means, roughly, that clinicians must respect the patient’s decision about his
medical care” (Groll, p. 195, 2014, italics added).
The rationale of the beneficence principle is fairly straightforward. In a simplistic sense, the
goal of psychiatric treatment is to heal or help people flourish psychologically, and
therefore clinicians must act in ways that are good for patients. The rationale of the
autonomy principle, on the other hand, deals with patients’ rights. Every individual has the
right to autonomy over their own person, and others ought to respect this. As Groll is quick
to point out, respecting patients’ rights and patients’ good can sometimes come into
conflict. Especially when a patient makes decisions that run counter to her interests, “[t]he
specter of medical paternalism arises in this conflict: clinicians act paternalistically when,
for the sake of the beneficence principle, they override or ignore the autonomy principle”
(p. 197, 2014). More generally, we may understand paternalism as acting for the sake of a
subject’s good regardless of their will. Psychiatric diagnosis and subsequent clinical
intervention, when these actions ignore patient autonomy, is paternalist.
Not all cases of ignoring an individual’s autonomy for the sake of their good are
necessarily impermissible, of course. Consider what you might do to prevent a non-native
language speaker from walking onto a minefield. Though it counts as paternalist, it seems
you would be perfectly justified to physically restrain that person, at least until they could
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be made to understand the danger that lies ahead (Groll, 2014). Nevertheless, whether
permissible or impermissible, paternalism implies wrongdoing in virtue of violating the
autonomy principle. Paternalist action is pro tanto wrong. For this reason, Groll argues,
“the burden of proof will fall on the clinician (or philosopher) that wants to argue that
paternalism is justified when dealing with competent patients” (p. 197, 2014).
1.2 Is Psychiatric Diagnosis Harmful?
What makes paternalist action in clinical psychiatry especially risky? Wanting to help make
people ‘better’, in whatever sense is appropriate, is an honest aspiration—but care must be
taken about what is meant by ‘better’. Who gets to decide who is mentally ill, and when, is
of grave importance when the downstream effects of receiving a psychiatric diagnosis can
include limiting the autonomy of the diagnosed. Because diagnosing an individual as having
a mental disorder can be a way of saying that they have a condition that is bad and ought to
be corrected, and that their pattern of behavior is somehow deviant or harmful, psychiatric
diagnosis can be, and has been, used as a tool of social control. And while diagnostic
categories themselves already carry evaluative content—we tend to treat individuals
diagnosed as mentally ill prejudicially in comparison to those we consider healthy (Banaji,
2013)—it has often been the case that those on the receiving end of psychiatric diagnosis
come from stigmatized, disadvantaged, or disenfranchised groups (Satcher, 2001).
For example, there is much controversy surrounding the diagnosis of disorders
commonly treated with psychoactive drugs such as antipsychotics, stimulants, and Selective
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs). Critics argue that a conflict of interest arising
between psychiatrists and the pharmaceutical industry’s representatives and lobbyists has
compromised prescription practices, and led to a dramatic increase in the diagnosis of
disorders such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), autism, and
depression and anxiety disorders (Healy, 2012; Elliot, 2004). The worry is not just that
these disorders have somehow been ‘invented’, but that the medicalization of these
individuals causes them harm (Hacking, 2006).
There are also clear historical cases of diagnostic categories which functioned as
nothing more than a means of institutionalized oppression. Homosexuality, hysteria, and

drapetomania, for example, have all once been considered mental disorders. Indeed,
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homosexuality continued to be classified as a mental disorder as late as 1973 in the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), despite several studies at the
time that showed that homosexual behavior is not linked to serious distress or disturbance.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, feeling faint, nervous, or irritable, or ‘causing trouble’
were thought to be symptoms of a sexual dysfunction afflicting women specifically
(Foucault, 1964; Murphy 2006).3 And perhaps the most shocking case of codified cultural
norms, drapetomania, was a diagnosis given to slaves in the years leading up to the civil war,
characterized by ‘the compulsion to flee’ (distinguished from dyesthaesia Aethiopica, a
slave’s lack of respect for the property rights of her owners) (Murphy, 2006). All in all,
western psychiatrists have often been “willing or merely compliant agents of political
oppression” when it comes to psychiatric diagnosis (Lewontin et al 1984 p.167).
It would be nice to think of drapetomania as a historical artifact, but there are
contemporary DSM diagnoses with an eerily similar flavor. Take, for example
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) and Conduct Disorder (CD), diagnoses given,
mainly to children and adolescents of color in the United States, characterized by
aggressive and anti-social behavior. Even taking for granted that these are genuine mental
illnesses that cause individuals to suffer, it is quite likely that the diagnostic label itself
perpetuates the conditions of social inequality that cause its symptoms. As Nancy Nyquist
Potter puts it, “[t]he concern is that schools and other institutions are not merely identifying
an existent mental disorder, but are creating the conditions under which that disorder
thrives” (p. 190, 2014). Cases like this introduce the worry that psychiatric practice today is
still merely a way of pathologizing unwanted behaviors, and that its prescriptions do not
actually encourage psychological flourishing.
1.3 Paternalism on Rough Epistemic Terrain
Even given the above considerations, we should take seriously the idea that there is genuine
mental suffering in individuals that can be explained naturally, whether by recourse to
social and environmental facts or underlying neuropathology, or both. This allows the
discipline of psychiatry to be situated as consilient with the other sciences of the mind,
3

Hysteria’s paradigmatic symptom profile survives in the DSM today under the auspices of somatoform and
dissociative disorders.
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which is essential to good clinical reasoning. Further, when psychiatry is grounded in
objective facts about the individuals it characterizes, the possibility for culturally relative
norms about what behaviors are and aren’t desirable to compromise psychiatric practice is
limited.
At the same time however, conceptualizing the discipline of psychiatry as a science
seems to put a sharper point on the basic problem. While it is true that psychiatry must
remain objective in the above sense, it is also essentially a normative enterprise. Evaluative
concepts such as health and wellness are crucial to psychiatric diagnosis. Indeed, diagnostic
categories themselves carry evaluative as well as motivational content. We consider a
person diagnosed with a mental disorder as having the same kinds of reasons to seek
treatment as they would if they were diagnosed as diabetic.4
For all these reasons, theorists and practitioners interested in mental disorder are
under an additional burden to make justified diagnoses. The puzzle of anosognosia
manifests itself in the difficulty of achieving this goal, that is, accurately and objectively
identifying mental illness from a third person perspective, while at the same time respecting
the individual subject’s autonomy. This puzzle is not unique to psychiatric medicine.5 But it
is perhaps made more difficult when, compared to symptoms of physical illness, symptoms
of psychological illness are often less readily apparent, less well understood, and
confounded by the tough philosophical and epistemic issues that surround the mental.
In other words, what makes paternalism in clinical psychiatry especially problematic
is that it occurs in such uncertain epistemic terrain. Symptom recognition relies on the
judgement of clinicians, and clinicians are fallible.6 In a recent paper, for example, Michael
Bishop and J. D. Trout, list and review nine families of diagnostic method currently used.
Some of these methods, especially those which rely more heavily on the opinion of the
clinician, have “an appalling track record” when it comes to accuracy (Bishop & Trout, p.
1027, 2013). Structured methods like computer-aided interview fare better but are far from
perfect. Some methods have not been validated at all (Bishop & Trout, 2013). Even with
4

For an interesting and nuanced perspective on this see Arpaly (2005).
Think, for instance, of those who choose to undergo helminthic therapy for autoimmune disease. They may
deny that they are sick, while fully aware that they now host hookworms.
6
Some worry that an ineliminable tacit dimension to clinical judgment further clouds the issue (Thornton,
2013).
5
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expert skill, clinicians may fall prey to a number of cognitive biases which can influence
diagnosis, such as confirmation bias, availability bias, stereotyping, and others (Poland &
Caplan, 2004). Epistemic difficulties create difficulties in producing justifications.
Given that the burden of proof is on the clinician to justify paternalist action with
explicit consideration of the individual patient’s circumstances, it is surprising how frequent
paternalist diagnosis and intervention occurs.7 The problem of paternalism in clinical

psychiatry is the problem of the frequent occurrence of clinical intervention—including
diagnosis—on the basis of unjustified standards. Overriding a patient’s autonomy in a
psychiatric context should be considered unwarranted by default, unless it can be shown
that this action is all things considered good for the patient. Without this subsequent
justification, the clinician fails to employ good clinical reasoning, and their paternalist
actions are harmful.
1.4 Grappling with the Descriptive and the Evaluative in Psychiatry
Criticizing the state of psychiatric practice today is easy. What of how philosophers of
psychiatry think about mental disorder in idealized contexts? Does ideal diagnostic
procedure employ good clinical reasoning?
In their helpful essay, Pieter Adriaens and Andreas De Block sort extant views of
mental disorder into three groups. As they write,
“[t]he philosophical debate about mental disorder is mainly a discussion
between normativists and naturalists. Naturalists hold that (mental) health is
a natural concept, while normativists argue that it is a normative one. A
third strand defends a hybrid concept, claiming that the concept of mental
disorder involves a conjunction of facts and values” (Adriaens & De Block,
2011, p. 19).
All three groups are concerned with mental activity which is in some sense abnormal.
According to Adriaens and DeBlock, “[a]ll naturalist approaches are convinced that a
7

This has prompted some theorists to conclude that the discipline “disempowers patients while justifying
professional authority” (Bracken & Thomas, p. 125, 2013). Indeed, there are large groups of individuals who
see themselves as ‘survivors’ of their experiences with clinical psychiatry (Bracken & Thomas, 2013). The
stigma against the survivor movement among practitioners is so strong, it has lead supportive clinicians to
write about resisting bias pseudonymously (Anthony, 2004).
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mental disorder is a deviation from a norm, but unlike normativists they argue that the
relevant norm is a biological norm” (Adriaens & De Block, 2011, p. 19, italics in original).
So, in all three cases, it is abnormality which is supposed to justify the evaluative claim that
a patient is disordered. In order to better understand the difference between normativist
and naturalist views, let’s consider their judgments in the following two cases.

JOHN HENRY is a successful, high-powered lawyer at a Washington firm.
He is well-known for taking cases on behalf of racial minorities and
LGBTQ individuals, which are both communities of which he considers
himself a constituent. John is known around the office for putting in long
hours, much longer than any of his colleagues, often at the expense of
restful sleep. He sometimes feels that his job puts him under considerable
stress, but, at the same time, dislikes taking holidays or breaks. John
Henry’s physician has suggested that he ought to monitor his blood
pressure more closely. Recently, he has been experiencing short periods of
trembling and shortness of breath.
VINCENT lives alone on a remote piece of property in the Pacific
Northwest. After college he began to remove himself from his social circles,
and now spends most of his time in his home, making highly detailed
wooden sculptures, based on the suggestions of ‘other voices.’ Vincent has
no phone or internet access, and interacts mostly with the owner of the
general store in a nearby town. He make a modest living by occasionally
making a sale of a sculpture. His buyers find him to be distant and abrasive,
and are often disturbed by his behavior, and lack of adherence to social
norms.
Beginning with normativist approaches, then, take the normativist view called

constructivism. Constructivism about mental disorders, as it is summarized by philosopher
of psychiatry Dominic Murphy in his book Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, is a view
distinguished by several related theses. It takes it to be the case that there are no objective
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facts that one can appeal to, to decide whether or not someone has a mental disorder.
Instead, all the relevant facts are social ones, as any talk of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ is
grounded in our values. It follows from this that there can be no science about mental
disorder. Mental disorders are just constructs used to talk about certain kinds of norm
transgressions (Murphy, 2006).
As I have argued, this lack of scientific objectivity is bad clinical reasoning. On a
constructivist account, whether or not someone is disordered will not necessarily accord
with the underlying causes of their behavior. For example, it is not whether Vincent hears
voices, but whether he admits to hearing them or reacts to them in any other way, which
makes him stand out. At least today in the West, Vincent deviates from common social
norms. Plausibly therefore, a constructivist may consider a person like him to be
disordered and therefore mentally ill, whether or not he hears voices at all.
In addition to being bad clinical reasoning, the very relativization of constructivist
judgments of Vincent to a particular (Western, contemporary) set of norms illuminates
how the view is infected with paternalism. One might easily imagine that Vincent would be
motivated to deny accusations that he is unwell, while agreeing that he hears voices, or that
he prefers to be alone. Is this a case of anosognosia, or is Vincent correct that he is not
mentally ill? What makes it the case that he ought to adhere to these norms? Because how
Vincent himself fares is never examined, constructivism cannot provide a defensible
answer.8 We do not know whether this prescription is good for Vincent.
At the other extreme from constructivism is a naturalist view Murphy calls simple

objectivism, which takes objective facts about human psychology to be the only relevant
facts. To be mentally disordered according to simple objectivism, then, is to function
atypically relative to our best current theory of psychological functioning. If our best
neuroscience says that John Henry’s, or Vincent’s brain or psychological functioning is
atypical, then they are disordered.
One way of caching this out, as Murphy mentions, is to conclude that there are no
such things as mental disorders, only somatic diseases. Thomas Szasz appears to have been

8

Conceivably, there may be a normativist view other than constructivism which takes the psychological
flourishing of the individual into account. I argue however, that as long as the place of descriptive facts and
consilence with other sciences of the mind are ignored, normativist accounts should be rejected.
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an eliminativist about the mental, and famously argued for such a view (Murphy, 2006;
Szasz, 1974). However, even though physicalists might think that any kind of talk about
psychological entities will have an explanation in terms of the behavior of physical entities,
it does not follow from this that there is nothing distinctively interesting about the sciences
of the mind and their subject. Christopher Boorse, for example, would be open to
diagnosing John Henry and Vincent with mental disorders, as long as it were demonstrated
that they deviate from the statistical biological norms of human psychological functioning
(Adriaens & DeBlock, 2011).9
Again, both John Henry and Vincent may agree that they are statistically atypical in
some way, and still claim that they do not need any kind of psychiatric intervention. Do
they have accurate self-knowledge in this regard? While Boorse’s view does effectively
consider some important descriptive facts, whether or not the subject is flourishing
psychologically is not part of what is examined. Further, as I have argued, it is unclear how
statistical atypicality alone, without some evaluative theory, can be a guide to mental illness.
Atypicality, after all, is a notion at some distance from suffering or distress.10 As Murphy
(2006) puts it, evaluative judgments cannot be all there is to mental disorder, but neither
can they be neglected. Paternalism again rears its ugly head; naturalist accounts make
claims about what is and is not mental disorder without the aid of any evaluative theory to
justify them.
2. Normative Authority
Both the normativist and naturalist accounts examined above run into a similar kind of
trouble. When confronted with plausible denials of the accuracy of psychiatric diagnosis,
neither account has the right tools to draw a line between misdiagnosis on one hand, and
illness and anosognosia on the other. Without the right normative theory, they fall prey to
paternalism.

Boorse makes a distinction here between disease and illness, arguing that an individual with a disease is ill
when that disease is harmful to them. This suggests to me some terminological dispute, and that debate
between Boorse and his contemporaries may be resolved by examining the referents of ‘disease’ and ‘illness’
respectively.
10
Adriaens and DeBlock (2011) further note that not all share the optimism that “a good naturalist account of
the concept of mental disorder provides the necessary tools to revolutionize psychiatric classification” (p. 23).
9
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There are several important questions which follow from the failures of naturalist
and normativist accounts of mental disorder. One question concerns just what the right
normative theory for psychiatry is. Investigating mental disorder without first understanding
what makes a condition an illness is in some sense putting the cart before the horse. A
second question concerns how this normative theory is related to the right descriptive or
explanatory theory. Clinicians must be able to show how their evaluative claims have a hold
on their subjects. Answering both of these goes beyond the scope of this paper, so in what
follows, I will focus on the first question. Here in section two I will highlight one feature
which is essential for a normative theory with properly justified evaluative standards.
Namely, it must have normative authority.
To understand how normative authority is crucial to psychiatric diagnosis, it is
helpful to examine a similar theoretical issue. In particular, the tension between the
putatively distinct realms of fact and value is a familiar challenge to those philosophers
working in the ethics of well-being and human flourishing—for example in the philosophical
literature surrounding the fast-growing field of positive psychology, which aims to
investigate well-being using the psychological sciences. In their paper on well-being,
Tiberius and Plakias articulate two competing pressures on a theory of well-being, noting
that on one hand, “[w]ell-being aims to pick out an empirical phenomenon that can be
measured, compared, and (one hopes) realized in people’s lives”, and on the other hand
that, “it has a kind of normative significance: it makes sense to promote well-being,
procuring it is a good thing to do” (p. 401, 2010, italics in original). Thus, as Tiberius and
Plakias describe the challenge, a good theory of well-being must be responsive to the twin
demands of empirical and normative adequacy. As they write,
“[o]ur argument aims to characterize well-being in a way that is both
empirically grounded and able to play the role in our ethical practice that it
needs to play. Normatively, if our account of well-being ends up being
something we have no reason to care about, then we have gone wrong
somewhere. Empirically, if an account of well-being implies that it cannot be
investigated, measured, and achieved, there is reason to look elsewhere,” (p.
402, 2010, italics in original).
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What exactly gives a theory the kind of normative significance which would justify
paternalist action? According to Tiberius and Plakias, a theory that is normatively adequate
has normative authority, “[t]he feature in virtue of which people have a reason to follow the
imperatives of a normative theory” (p. 419, 2010). In other words, a theory that concerns
the kind of human-centered value that is important in discussions of flourishing is one that
concerns the attributive/relational kind of good, good for, where one part of that relation is
the individual it is about. It speaks to individuals’ interests. Without this link, dictums of
the theory will at best be uninteresting. Individuals may find that the theory does not
address their concerns or actually help them flourish. At worst, individuals may be subject
to the kinds of paternalist concerns outlined earlier—they may find that the theory harms
them if its imperatives take the form of social or legal demands that can limit autonomy.
Because psychiatric practice operates in exactly this kind of context, properly
justified evaluative standards for psychiatric diagnosis are of utmost concern. In order to
ensure that the concept of mental illness will be a useful one for theorizing about human
flourishing which picks out a real psychological phenomenon in human lives, it must have
normative authority. In particular, we should find that (1) what the theory recommends
actually promotes the interests of everyone to whom the theory is supposed to apply, and
(2) that there are standards of justification for these recommendations.11 In what follows in
2.1 I will consider how one kind of hybrid theory of mental disorder fares in this regard.
2.1 Failures to Provide Normative Authority
The standard way of reserving some place for both normative judgments and objective facts
in a theory of mental disorder is to analyze the concept, and see what theses if any are
supported by our commonsense intuitions about what counts as disorder. This
methodology has attracted many contemporary analytic philosophers, who typically share
the view that some combination of Jerome Wakefield’s ‘harm-dysfunction’ thesis and a

11

It should be noted that I diverge from Tiberius and Plakias’ work here in one important respect. In their
account of well-being, Tiberius and Plakias rely on a kind of internalism about reasons, and suggest that
theories with normative authority supply individuals with motivating and justifying reasons. Personally, I am
unsure that human individuals are sufficiently like the kinds of agents most reasons internalists are concerned
about, and thus would like to distance myself from reasons-talk. That said, what I have to say here should be
compatible with many different accounts of what and individuals’ ‘interests’ are.
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folk-psychological picture of the mind will generate the concept of mental disorder as it is
‘prototypically understood’ (Graham, 2010). Following Murphy, we may call this hybrid
account the ‘orthodox view’ (Murphy, 2006).
According to the orthodox view, a particular dysfunction is a mental disorder when
it is both distinctively mental, and harmful to an individual. Clinicians decide which kinds
of dysfunctions are mental by appealing to existing disciplinary conventions (Murphy,
2006). Perhaps, John Henry should be diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, and Vincent
with schizotypal personality disorder, as outlined in the DSM-V. Of course, the orthodox
theorist must have some way of determining both when an atypicality is a dysfunction, and
what counts as harm. As long as that notion of harm is tangled in existing disciplinary
conventions of psychiatry as it is practiced today, then there is a good chance that our
contingent cultural values guide inquiry in an unjustified way (Murphy, 2006). In his 2010
book, The Disordered Mind, Graham attempts to give one such hybrid account. In the
next section, I will argue that his account fails to have normative authority because it does
not ground what it means to be mentally ill or mentally healthy in the concerns of the
individual patient.

2.1.1 George Graham on Mental Disorder
Graham’s account of mental disorder consists of four theses. On his view, a mental
disorder is a disability in one or more rational or basic psychological capacities (rationality-

disability thesis), that has harmful or potentially harmful consequences (harm thesis). This
disability must have its source in both ‘brute neural causes’ as well as more central, rational,
or ‘intentionalistic’ activity (mixed-source thesis), where the reason-responsive capacities of
the source in question are impaired, but not destroyed entirely (some preservation of

rationality thesis) (2010).
As a hybrid account, one of the virtues of Graham’s view is his recognition that
normative considerations must be built directly into the concept of mental disorder. In fact,
three of his four theses make significant evaluative claims. The harm thesis invokes the idea
that mental disorders directly inhibit the flourishing of their subjects. However, this thesis
leaves open exactly what constitutes a harm. This is where the rationality-disability thesis,
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and the some preservation of rationality thesis come in. Graham proposes that healthy
human beings exhibit some standards of rationality, and that the preservation of this
rational capacity is what is crucial for mental health. He argues that when a disorder “gums
up the works” of our ability to meet this standard, we are categorically harmed (Graham, p.
8, 2010).
According to Graham, then, an individual’s irrationality or unreasonableness can
serve as a standard for mental disorder. Of course, it is one thing to claim that there are
some or other norms or standards of reasoning, and another to claim that a particular
theory of rationality applies universally; especially if such a theory is to be grounded in facts
about how human beings actually reason. Such cross-cultural claims are notoriously
difficult to justify.12 A theory of rationality must be assessed on its own terms before we can
even understand its applicability to a theory of mental disorder.
The theory of rationality Graham endorses is one quite familiar to Western analytic
philosophers of mind, which uses a Western, folk-psychological framework to explain
behavior. Graham calls this the rationality-in-Intentionality thesis (RIT), which posits that,
“a rational person in the RIT sense, ideally is not merely devoid of illogical
or inconsistent attitudes, but someone with a definite positive description of
their character and goals in life. If possible, they choose after deliberation,
avoid acting on unreflective impulses, and maintain a certain level of
prudence, self-regard or self-responsibility that balances their present or
current preferences against next weeks, and next years, those of midlife and
possible old age,” (Graham, p. 122, 2010).
To further illustrate this kind of rationality, Graham refers to several exemplars
which he takes to be paradigmatic of mental disorder. Many diagnoses found in the DSM,
including depression and anxiety disorders, delusions, and substance abuse disorders,
describe ‘irrational’ ways of behaving, in the RIT sense. It is because of this apparent
irrationality that we should consider individuals with these symptoms as unwell.

12

As meticulously outlined in Henrich et. al (2010), a picture is beginning to emerge from recent empirical
evidence that—to the extent there is a core of human psychological nature—this core is much smaller than was
thought even fifteen years ago. For more on how this effects psychiatric diagnosis see the previous chapter.

55

Take John Henry, then—so described, John Henry plausibly represents many
upper-middle class professionals in the United States, and without knowing much more
about him, we may classify his behavior as irrational in the RIT sense. Based on his work
schedule, his physical condition, and his physician’s advice, John Henry seems to be
spending a lot more time thinking about what’s happening in the next five years than what’s
happening in the next forty, perhaps sacrificing his well-being or ability to meet his goals
later in life for the ability to meet his goals now. On Graham’s view, this kind of behavior is
disordered. More obviously, Vincent is irrational in the RIT sense as well simply because
he hears voices that do not correspond to his environment. Of course, John Henry and
Vincent may claim to be unmotivated by Graham’s injunctions to ‘act rationally’. Indeed it
is likely that both disagree with Graham over just what behaving rationally might consist in.
But can they sensibly claim that they are not mentally ill, or do they suffer from
anosognosia?
Consider Vincent: perhaps he finds his behavior perfectly warranted, arguing that
he is happiest on his own engaging in artistic creation and his own aesthetic experience of
the world, and that therefore he is neither irrational nor disordered for doing so. Of
course, whether or not one is behaving rationally does not come down to believing so. But
it should be noted that the kinds of recommendations the RIT thesis gives are based on a
picture of the mind which takes paradigmatic human behavior to be characterized by
accurate and reflexive self-direction, and that this has recently been called into question by
a growing body of literature that sees much of human cognition as automatic and
unreflective (Doris, 2009).13 Even if Graham’s picture of rationality succeeds in defeating
these concerns, however, a more serious problem remains.
Remember, mental health, like well-being, should be good for an individual; the
prescriptions of Graham’s theory, in this case for Vincent to ‘act rationally’, should be good

for Vincent. As Vincent’s protestations reveal, it is an open question whether seeking
treatment for auditory hallucinations would be good for Vincent’s psychological flourishing.
Graham’s RIT analysis seems to miss this about Vincent’s case, instead making some

13

Graham, and others who endorse these kinds of reflectivist views—are under a burden to show that we can
even come close to being ‘devoid of illogical or inconsistent attitudes’, or that we choose after deliberation
and avoid unreflective impulses much of the time. For more see Doris (2015).
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alarmingly specific assumptions about what is good for him without establishing that this is
necessarily the case. A clinician following Graham’s theory would diagnosis Vincent
without considering whether Vincent shared that conclusion, and without considering the
possibility that he is not in fact harmed by his ‘irrationality’. Unless Graham can show that
acting rationally in the RIT sense optimizes every individual’s interests, his account of
mental illness fails have normative authority.
3. Eliminating Paternalism
It is possible to extend the above arguments to any theory which grounds mental health in
norms external to the individual. Tiberius and Plakias make a similar point about so-called
objective list theories of well-being, noting that it is difficult to see how accounts with
specific norms can have a legitimate claim to be action guiding given the gap between those
normative claims and subjective experience (Tiberius & Plakias, 2010). Indeed, if it is
possible that human individuals (however best conceived) do not share the same list of
things which ground their well-being then objective list theories will not provide normative
authority.
Similarly with mental health, an evaluative standard that is not grounded in what
would actually be better for each actual patient fails to have normative authority. This
suggests that mental health should be located in the subjective point of view. In order to
solve the problem of paternalism, psychiatry must ground what it means to be mentally ill
or mentally healthy in the concerns of individual patients. Whatever the right normative
theory has to say about John Henry and Vincent, it must pay due respect to their
flourishing. For this reason, the right normative theory for psychiatric diagnosis must be

individualist; it must ground what it means to be mentally ill or mentally healthy in the
concerns of the individual subject it treats. I will have a bit more to say on this idea in 3.1,
before considering a number of objections to the view in 3.2.
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3.1 Individualism about Mental Health
Individualism about mental illness does not mean that we ought to be subjectivist with
regard to psychiatric diagnosis. Many have expressed worries about making such a move, as
this would not allow for the fact that individuals do not often know what is best for them. In
his book, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, philosopher Dan Haybron argues from a wealth of
empirical evidence that “[i]ndividuals’ judgments about their own lives do not bear anything
like the kind of authority that common opinion takes them to” (p.80, 2008). Of course, this
is just to highlight the possibility of anosognosia. But individualism with respect to mental
health, which denies that there is one objective list of norms that are necessarily good for all
humans, is not the same as a subjective account that does not allow for fundamental errors
about ones values or interests.14 Things are not good for individuals ‘just because’ they say
so. Here, I am in agreement with Groll’s view that, “[i]n a normal clinical encounter,
clinicians can have open, frank discussions with the patient about what is best for the
patient without thereby acting paternalistically” (p. 191, 2014).
Fortunately, exactly how to determine what is good for human beings is something
that is being gradually revealed by empirical research on happiness and life-satisfaction.
This can easily be extended to subjects of psychiatric care. It may even be the case that
there is at least some statistical norm at work about what values and goals help human
being flourish psychologically. Several philosophers have recently made an attempt at
articulating values that most humans share in this sense, Haybron and Tiberius among
them. Even if some set of values or virtues is important for all human beings in a statistical
sense, however, it is not because of some special status those values have but because,
contingently, they do in fact promote flourishing for most individuals.15 Researchers should
be prepared to encounter some values or bases for flourishing which look strange from a
Western perspective.
14

This tripartite distinction (individualism vs. subjectivism vs. objectivism) is my main motivation for labeling
this thesis ‘individualism’. There are other philosophical arenas that use this term differently. In his groundclearing book on the individual in the cognitive sciences Rob Wilson makes another important distinction,
claiming that “individualism is the thesis that psychological states should be construed without reference to
anything beyond the boundary of the individual who has those states… those who deny individualism are
externalists” (p. 10, 2004). In this sense, my thesis is an externalist one, as what is good for the individual
subject may depend on features of the environment beyond the boundaries of the individual.
15
For more on contemporary attempts to measure psychological well-being see the work of Kalisch et. al
(2015) on resilience as well as research on gross national happiness (Centre for Bhutan Studies, 2015).
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3.2 Objections Considered
At first gloss, one may wonder why it is not as easy to tell whether someone has a mental
disorder as it is to diagnose them with a physical disease. We don’t tend to take people
seriously who disagree with their physicians over whether they have HIV or are paraplegic.
But if we see these diagnoses as something beyond mere descriptions—as normative claims
about health or injunctions to seek treatment—physical medicine is equally philosophically
murky. Disagreements over the concept of health apply to physical medicine as well
(Boorse, 2011). Some disability advocates even claim that the idea that there is something
‘wrong’ with their way of being is entirely a matter of unwarranted social conventions
(Amundson, 1999).
Either way, in both arenas there is an intuition that there must be more to disease
and disorder than the interests of the individuals under evaluation.16 In this final section I
will consider three forms of this intuition, which I will call the Successful Psychopath,
Wellness Syndrome, and Conversion Therapy objections, and reject each.

3.2.1 The Successful Psychopath
Vincent hears voices. One might feel that this should be considered disordered whether it
is good for Vincent or not. This raises the question of how we should treat patients who are
considered to be less than fully rational (and perhaps, then, less than fully autonomous)
(Dworkin, 2014). The thought is that facts about Vincent’s psychology undermine the
significance of his avowals about what is good for him. Of course we all, to some extent,
harbor false beliefs about what would be good for us, and this does not automatically
render us incompetent patients. Surely we want to leave room for competent patients to
err.17
Take an even harder case: that of the ‘successful psychopath,’ an individual who’s
psychological functioning fits the DSM criteria for psychopathy, but who is also flourishing.

16
17

Many thanks to Tim Schroeder for helpful discussions on this topic.
For a fuller discussion on the criteria for when a patient fails to be competent, see the concluding chapter.
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The thought is that, if individualism about mental illness means the successful psychopath
is no psychopath at all, then it is a reason to reject individualism.
Suppose that on the right normative theory for psychiatry, the successful
psychopath is indeed mentally healthy. As a first response, it should be stressed that this
does not mean that there is nothing cognitively or neurologically atypical about him which
is interesting from the point of view of the sciences of the mind and human behavior. If
one means ‘psychopathy’ to pick out a typical deviation consisting of mere descriptive facts
about an individual, then of course this label applies. But this is not how the dual nature of
psychiatry works.
I am willing to bite the bullet here, if it is indeed a bullet to bite. There may be
interesting expressions of psychological atypicality which fit the criteria for mental illness in
some cases but not others. The successful psychopath is a legitimate possibility.18 One
additional virtue of this response, I think, is that it makes sense of what is going on in cases
like the autism rights movement, and other neurodiversity movements, where individuals
claim that their diagnosis is no disorder at all, but just another way of being on the
spectrum of human psychological variation. There are many who assert that they live full,
flourishing human lives, despite psychological atypicality.19

3.2.2 The Wellness Syndrome
Perhaps these considerations lead you to the worry that individualism about mental illness
leads to an opposite kind of problem—that of overinclusivity. As Geoffery Miller (2011)
puts it there may be “no principled distinction between maladaptive disorder and ‘normal
variation’,” in the discipline of psychiatry. As he writes,
“[t]he implication is that almost all living humans beings have many
mental disorders, mostly minor but some major, and these include not
just DSM disorders like depression and schizophrenia, but diverse forms
18

This has nothing to do with our areteic judgments, or judgments of responsibility. If the psychopath is also a
murderer, we should surely put him in jail (but not because he is mentally ill… because he is a murderer!)
19
There may be a further worry here about psychological conditions which ‘gum up the works’ of individuals
interests. In other words, what if what is best for the heroin addict is to sit around ingesting heroin until they
die? This is a question I am very much interested in, but which depends on other features of the right
normative theory for the discipline of psychiatry which go beyond the scope of this paper.
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of stupidity, irrationality, religiosity, vices, and personality quirks” (p. viii,
2011).
Miller himself is comfortable with this possibility. I am as well. Whether or not it is
considered a disorder, not having any coping skills, for example, is very much a problem of
mental health, even if it doesn’t look like any diagnostic category we are currently familiar
with. Consider one final case.

OCTAVIA is a writer who works from home. She enjoys her work-life set
up because it allows her to spend more time with her sister and nephews,
who she lives with. Octavia has always considered herself to be distractible;
growing up she had trouble focusing in school, and nowadays she spends
more time reading blogs on the internet than she would like. Octavia is
happy with her modest career success, but admits that she might be more
productive if she were able to concentrate more easily.
It seems clear that Octavia may enjoy the benefits of the therapeutic aspects of psychiatric
practice to improve her life, just as John Henry and Vincent. That her problems are
common or modest are not appropriate barriers to understanding them from a psychiatric
perspective.

3.2.3 Conversion Therapy
One way to judge what would be good for a person, all things considered, is to ask how
they would fare if their values or desires were other that what they are. John Henry, for
instance, might flourish to a greater extent if he cared less about his political causes,
because the good he would get from investing in a family life, for example, would outweigh
the good he can get now. For my part, I am perfectly willing to accept the truth of this
counterfactual claim, and so might John Henry. But he may find that he cannot simply
decide to have other interests than the ones he does. There may be other forms of control
he can take over his values, but if he does not want to exercise these options, then to
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intervene would be to act against his will. For this reason I would deny that it has any
implications for the justifiability of acting paternalistically on John Henry’s behalf.20
What then, if a patient elects to change their desires in order to increase their good.
Take one of the most controversial cases of this today, that of so called ‘conversion
therapy’ for homosexuality. A patient may plausibly argue that, given the social
circumstances they have been born into, including harms stemming from discrimination
and institutionalized oppression, they would be better off with heteronormative desires.
Does it follow that, on an individualist account of mental illness, homosexuality is a mental
disorder? Absolutely not. Altering ones desires may effectively relieve a kind of suffering in
this case, but the underlying cause of that suffering is a set of social facts rather than
psychological ones.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have argued that clinical psychiatry faces a special kind of problem with
paternalist action, the frequent occurrence of clinical intervention on the basis of unjustified
standards. Because of this, in the face of avowals from competent patients that they are not
ill, the burden of proof falls on the clinician to show that a diagnosis is justified. Further I
have argued that clinical psychiatry must ground what it means to be mentally ill or
mentally healthy in the concerns of individuals.
Some of the considerations in the last section highlight the complex interaction
between those psychological features of an individual which are bound by the skin and
skull, and those which are features of being situated in a particular environment. This
suggests the possibility that, as with well-being, individualism about mental illness may give
way to a more contextualist view, where more emphasis is placed on living in a context that
fosters mental health (for more see: Haybron, 2008). I see my arguments here are happily
compatible with that move, and will have more to say about context in the next chapter.

20

Even supposing there was a magic pill that could alter desires, we should be cautious about what this action
would even amount to. Recent evidence suggests that it is an individual’s moral traits that above all else
determine their personal identity (Strohminger & Nichols, in press). Taking the pill may amount to changing
the very person John Henry is, and this possibility is outside the scope of my considerations here.
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4. STEWARDSHIP OF THE MIND:
HOW AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE CAN HELP US UNDERSTAND
PSYCHIATRIC THERAPY

1. We Don’t Have to Be the Way We Are
One of the most interesting things about being human is the emphasis we place on our
betterment. Hardly even the most sainted among us are considered perfectly rational,
perfectly virtuous, or perfectly healthy by any standard. The idea that there is room for
improvement, along with the fact that we are able to change the way we are in a goaldirected manner, then, invites a special kind of opportunity to do so.
It is not always clear if one ought to change, or in what way. Human nature, human
variability, and the possibility of a ‘transhuman’ or ‘posthuman’ future are all areas of
intense philosophical debate. But there are also relatively mundane cases of betterment on
which most would agree—if I get a hang nail I would do better to let it heal rather than pick
at it all day. Cases of illness, especially mental illness, are similarly straightforward. The idea
that someone is mentally ill automatically invokes the idea that she may change for the
better.1 The further question is how. What is the recipe for therapeutic change in clinical
psychiatry?
To begin with, a proper account of how to effect therapeutic change should be
consistent with our best theories of the human mind and human behavior. Particularly
when it comes to identifying the specific clinical practices and techniques that best address
mental illness, an improved understanding of what kinds of things we are affords an
improved understanding of the most efficient kinds of leverage we have over ourselves, so

1

This is controversial, of course, but it will be one of the starting assumptions of what follows. For more on
the normative character of the concept of mental health, see previous chapters.
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to speak. In this paper, I will examine two extant and opposing pictures, and their influence
on thinking about psychiatric therapy. First, what I will call the ‘traditional picture’
represents the dominant trend in Western thinking about the human mind. The traditional
picture is not a view of the mind in itself, but a collection of views in philosophy and the
human sciences distinguished by commitments to a species of ‘internalism’ about the mind.
Second, what I will call the ‘ecological picture’ represents a rival trend that has been gaining
influence in recent years. The ecological picture rejects internalism.
As I intend to show, tacit reliance on the traditional picture has had a limiting
influence on what is viewed as therapeutic intervention and hindered our pursuit of the
question of therapeutic change. Under its influence, dealing with mental illness has been
framed as an inward-focused process—deep reflection, will power, and perhaps the
occasional pharmaceutical drug being the recognizable tools at hand (Saks, 2013).2 Clinical
intervention, in other words, tends to be limited to the boundaries of the skin and skull.
This is unfortunate for those with a practical interest in managing mental health, as it
prevents many everyday methods of managing mental health from being seen as ‘real’
therapeutic techniques. By taking an ‘ecological turn’, therefore, psychiatric science can
avail itself to a wider array of therapeutic techniques to investigate and assess.
Throughout this paper, I will argue for two general claims. First, that a broadly
ecological picture of the mind provides a better explanatory framework from which to
understand both what has gone wrong in cases of mental illness, and how successful
therapeutic interventions generate improvement. Second, that this explanatory fit in turn
gives us new reasons to prefer ecological views over more orthodox views of the mind. An
ecological perspective provides unique insights that can help teach us how to be better,
mentally. Given the substantial impact of mental suffering worldwide, this is no mean feat.
My defense of these claims will first involve spelling out what the traditional and
ecological pictures are, and how they relate to each other. Once this has been done, in
section two I will develop an ecological account of psychiatric therapy which casts human
agents as stewards of their own—and often others’—cognitive ecology.3 From this ecological
2

Illustrated not just by individual clinicians, but by the methodology of dominant research trends such as
pharmacology and behavioral genetics.
3
In some sense, managing mental health can be thought of as a collective endeavor, mutually enforced
through our social relations. This prospect is included in the stewardship picture.
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perspective, therapeutic techniques are best conceived of as a species of what I will call

agential technologies: a set of often non-obvious methods and strategies of control
supporting goal directed cognition and behavior, whose pathway of influence over behavior
and psychological functioning often loops outside the boundaries of the skin and skull.
Agential technologies facilitate agency in situations where our internal resources may not be
enough, intervening on psychological features which underlie mental illness, and thereby
supporting goal directed change. Finally in section three, I will turn to a number of
contemporary proposals for improving psychological well-being from the philosophical and
psychological literature. I will show that, in successful cases, goal-directed change is
mediated ecologically—that is, becoming mentally healthy is about managing one’s cognitive
ecology in the right way.4
In the remainder of section one, then, it is my task to set out the relevant
philosophical picture. I begin in section 1.1 by drawing together several contemporary
analyses of the human mind as traditionally conceived, followed in section 1.2 by reviewing
arguments for rejecting this picture in favor of a broadly ecological one. In section 1.3 I will
elaborate the ecological picture using several recent philosophical projects which apply this
perspective to more concrete domains of human cognition.
1.1 The Traditional Picture
From a historical perspective, it is generally agreed that Descartes’ conception of the mind
as ‘seated’ in the body and, since the 20th century, the ‘computer metaphor’ for thought
have been the defining influences in thinking about the mind in the West. We might
understand these metaphors as underscoring a conception of the mind as being internal in
some way. Thus, though there is no customary or standard view of the mind to which most
Western philosophers refer, what I am conceiving of as the traditional picture might be
distinguished by the idea that human cognition—whatever it is that humans do when they
think, which leads then to action—is a thing that happens inside human brains and nowhere
else. It is principally grounded in structures bound by the skin and skull.

4

The term ‘cognitive ecology’ is owed to work by philosopher of cognitive science Edwin Hutchins.
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Rob Wilson (2004) helpfully lays out two theses that formalize the assumptions of
the traditional picture. As he states, for any psychological function or ability, X,5 it is
thought that,
“Internal Richness Thesis: Structures and processes internal to the
individual that are important to the acquisition and development of X are
rich; and

External Minimalism Thesis: Structures and processes external to an
individual play at best a secondary causal role in the acquisition and
development of X” (p. 15).
As Wilson argues, these theses guide inquiry into human cognition on the traditional
picture, and restrict both what kinds of explanations of our psychological capacities count
as legitimate and where and how it is assumed that we can intervene on them.6 To see how
this works, it is helpful to consider how the traditional picture, while generally taken for
granted, has been foregrounded in recent years by efforts to reject the internalist paradigm.
For example in his 2015 book, Talking to Ourselves, John Doris surveys a large
portion of the philosophical literature on agency and action, drawing out what he argues is
an implicitly relied on picture he calls reflectivism. As he writes,
“[t]he exercise of human agency consists in judgment and behavior ordered
by self-conscious reflection about what to think and do. In an exercise of
agency, as construed by reflectivism, a person correctly divines the beliefs,
desires, and other psychological states relevant to her decision, makes her
decision in light of these states (sometimes called her reasons), and acts
accordingly” (p. x, 2015).
As Doris points out, we traditionally think of ourselves as guided by internal psychological
states such as beliefs and desires, to which we have a special kind of first-personal access.
Similarly, in his 2011 book on externalism and moral psychology, Andrew Sneddon
characterizes what he calls the ‘general view’, that “[a]ction production mechanisms
5

For example, perception, language use, moral cognition, etc.
Exactly how ‘rich’ our internal architecture is, or how ‘secondary’ our external environments are, of course,
varies from theory to theory.
6
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function in regular pattered ways with substantial independence from contextual
contingencies” and that “[t]hat these mechanisms are in principle accessible to agents
introspectively” (p. 184). Here, Sneddon makes explicit a corollary to this internalist
paradigm, that ‘contextual contingencies’ such as features of our social and physical
environments do not guide our behavior except in a contingent or accidental way. There is
also an underappreciated normative dimension to the concept of human agency, that to be
a rational agent, one ought to reason by inspecting the contents of one’s mind and using
internal principles to make decisions based on these contents. For example, in their (2004)
paper on rationality Richard Samuels and Stephen Stich remark that,
“[t]hough researchers in this area rarely offer an explicit and general
normative theory of rationality, we think that most authors tacitly adopt
some version of what Edward Stein has called the “Standard Picture” of
rationality: According to this picture, to be rational is to reason in
accordance with principles of reasoning that are based on rules of logic,
probability theory and so forth… [these] are the principles we ought to
reason in accordance with (Stein 1996, 4)”.
Questioning the internal richness and external minimalism theses, as we will see
that Wilson himself does, has been a large part of the work of philosophers like Doris, and
Sneddon. Influenced by the rapid growth of the sciences of the mind and human behavior
in the past few decades, this ‘ecological turn’ takes many forms, but the common thread is a
rejection of the skin and skull as essential boundaries of the mind, along with, to a lesser
orgreater extent depending on the theorist, a rejection of broadly ‘nativist’ claims about
cognition.7 These arguments are the focus of the next section.
1.2 Making the Ecological Turn
7

I have in mind here a wide swath of views, including not only the semantic externalism of Putnam (1975),
Burge (1979), and Fodor (1987, 1994), and Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) more radical extended mind thesis, but
the development of other ‘externalist’ ideas in philosophy of mind in Dennett (2003), Wilson, (2004), Clark
(2007), Shapiro (2007) and Ismael (2007). Other thinkers take cues from evolutionary anthropology,
emphasizing the importance of social learning and cultural information for human cognition, such as
Sterelny’s (2003, 2012) niche construction theory, and gene culture co-evolutionary theory as presented in
Richerson and Boyd (2005), Boyd and Richerson (2005), and Henrich (2011). A third strain of thought looks
at the effects of situational features and environmental structures on moral cognition in particular, for
example see Doris (1998, 2002), Merritt (2000), and Vargas (2013). For a fuller review of the literature see
Hutchins (2010).
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Arguments for rejecting the traditional picture in favor of one that sees human cognition as
intimately integrated into our bodies and worlds have appeared in many different forms.
Here, I will focus on a few that will help us get a better grasp on just what the ecological
picture is, and what it means for thinking about the capabilities and limits of the mind. To
start, the arguments I am interested in can be usefully sorted into three distinct flavors.
First, there are evolutionary arguments that examine the anthropological record and
evolutionary theory as a source of evidence for thinking of human cognition as essentially
environmentally situated. Next, there are insightful arguments in philosophy of mind that
question some of the metaphysical commitments of traditional views. These arguments
may, in fact, underlie much ecologically-minded thinking. Finally, there are arguments that
use recent empirical work in social psychology and applied cognitive science to show that
the traditional picture is incompatible with facts about how humans think and act.
After examining each of these arguments in turn, I will spell out the ecological
picture in more detail, and go on to show how it has influenced recent theorizing about
human cognition.

1.2.1 Evolutionary Arguments
A recurrent puzzle in the behavioral sciences concerns the question of human uniqueness—
explaining how we exhibit complex social features such as large scale cooperation and
language use, and how we, unlike other species, have been able to adapt to such diverse
environments worldwide. As more and more of our internal cognitive endowments are
revealed to be shared in common with non-human animals, many long standing theories
purporting to explain human uniqueness have fallen out of favor, such as the proposal that
non-human animals lack sentience (Low, 2012). Still, the idea that there are some features
of our psychological nature that are distinctively human has remained. Which, if any, are
they?
In their influential defense of the gene-culture coevolutionary hypothesis, Robert
Boyd and Peter Richerson suggest that the right answer to this puzzle involves thinking not
just about how we have evolved as biological organisms, but how our cultural environments
have evolved with us, and how these two evolutionary processes have mutually influenced
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each other. In their book Not by Genes Alone, Boyd and Richerson argue that culture8 is
part of biology, an essential human adaptation subject to similar evolutionary processes as
our genes (2005). Three theses comprise this view. First, that our capacity to generate
cumulative cultures across generations is itself an adaptation; in other words, as Boyd and
Richerson show, it was at some point advantageous for us to acquire the capacity to
transmit and store cultural information, both in our brains and environments. Second, that
culture itself evolves; our tools, norms, and customs change in response to selective
pressures. Third, that genes and culture coevolve; they mutually and inextricably
influencing each other over time (Boyd & Richerson, 2005).
According to the gene-culture coevolutionary view, then, what is unique to human
psychological nature is not merely an excess of the kind of sophisticated intelligence that
underlies abstract reasoning and problem solving in individuals, as this is insufficient to
explain our species’ success. Rather, it is the accumulation of information in human
cultures which has allowed us to thrive. By way of example, Boyd and Richerson, along
with Joe Henrich, have this to say about difficulties humans face in the Central Arctic:
“To stay warm and get enough to eat, you have to know how to make and
use clothes, snow houses, lamps, harpoons, leisters, and bows. We have
omitted other crucial tools like kayaks, dog sleds, and sun goggles, and of
course, we have had to omit most of the details necessary to make and use
the tools we did mention. Moreover, there is still much more you have to
know to stay alive. Predicting storms, understanding the habits of game
species, making baskets, building sledges, and managing dogs—all require
extensive knowledge. Traveling on ice is essential, but also treacherous, and
there is much to know about how the current temperature, recent weather,
and the color and texture of the ice tell you where and when it is safe to
travel…” (p. 3, 2011).
Even given ‘superior’ abstract intelligence, Boyd et al. show, no individual could plausibly
acquire all of the knowledge necessary to survive these conditions without culture and high8

In Boyd and Richersons’ sense, ‘culture’ is “information capable of affecting individual’s behavior that they
acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social
transmission” (p. 5, 2005). I will follow their use of the term here.
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fidelity cultural learning to rely on (2011). Indeed, many of the tools mentioned above
could only be perfected by the accumulation of small improvements over generations. As
Boyd et al. write, “[e]ven experts lack a detailed causal understanding of the tools and
techniques that permit them to survive” (p. 7, 2011). If there is anything unique about
human psychological nature, those mechanisms that drive cultural learning undergird it.
Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich themselves are explicitly ecologically minded, in that
they understand this view as an alternative to views of the evolution of human cognition
with more nativist and modular tendencies, like those held by John Tooby, Leda
Cosmides, Steven Pinker and others.9 The ‘cognitive niche’, Boyd et al. claim, is more
usefully thought of as a cultural niche (p. 2, 2011). If they are right, and human minds are
deeply reliant on human culture, the internal richness and external minimalism theses are
immediately called into question—the acquisition and development of many of our
cognitive capacities relies on external structures. Looking outside the skin and skull, at how
human cultures differentially affect human beings worldwide, is necessary to fully explain
uniquely human psychological abilities, and how they have evolved.
Kim Sterelny is another thinker with even more radical anti-nativist and antimodular views. According to his scaffolded mind hypothesis, “[h]uman cognitive capacities
both depend on and have been transformed by environmental resources” (Sterelny, p. 472,
2010). While Boyd and Richerson suggest that some domain-specific modules10 might be
required for individuals to exercise cultural learning, Sterelny’s view proposes a more barebones picture of our innate endowment that employs mostly domain-general mechanisms.
The scaffolding which structures our learning environments and epistemic niches supplies
the cognitive structure which our innate endowment lacks.
In his 2003 book, Thought in a Hostile World, Sterelny argues that cultural
learning itself is a result of the unusual confluence of several evolutionary mechanisms that
themselves have an ecological character. These are cooperation, or mutually beneficial
group actions with conspecifics, cumulative niche construction, the active structuring of the
physical, social, and epistemic environment both for intra and intergenerational benefit,
9

Of course, these thinkers do not deny the importance of cultural learning, just as Boyd et al. do not deny the
importance of abstract thinking (2011). The dispute is over how much each mechanism can explain human
variation.
10
Like, perhaps, a ‘theory of mind’ module for interpreting the behavior of others (Boyd & Richerson, 2005).
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and phenotypic plasticity, particularly our capacity to absorb the vastly different
psychological processes traits, or capacities depending on varying developmental
environments (Sterelny 2003; 2010). While none of these traits are unique to humans,
together they have bootstrapped human evolution in such a way that has produced our
distinctively human psychological nature. As hominids evolved to become more
cooperative, the story goes, this increased the benefit of both niche construction and
plasticity, and so on. Each mechanism in turn compounds the fitness of the other
mechanisms, creating a positive feedback loop that has reduced the role of our genetic
endowment (2003). The scaffolded mind hypothesis thus implies that a profound shift
should be taken away from the traditional picture of the human mind by walking further
away than Boyd and Richerson from the notion that internal structures must be ‘rich’ or
external ones ‘secondary’ (Sterelny, 2010). Our innately specified structures are simply not
enough to explain our cognitive capacities.

1.2.2 Arguments by Metaphysical Hypothesis
Of course, one can take many evolutionary insights onboard without giving up on the
traditional picture. It might be maintained—rejecting the letter of Boyd et al. and Sterelny’s
views about what psychological components are native to the human mind, if not the taste
of their evolutionary perspective—that when these theories make recourse to things ‘outside
the individual’, such as our bodies, niches, or cultures, they should be interpreted as
making claims about the proximate causes of human behavior rather than about how
cognition is constituted. This shifts the debate to a question about the boundaries of the
mind. Culture is important, the thought goes, but that’s just not where minds are realized;
minds are realized in brains. If this case can be made, then accepting the gene-culture
coevolutionary hypothesis or the scaffolded mind hypothesis need not entail that one reject
the internal richness and external minimalism theses. This move is reminiscent of the now
familiar coupling-constitution fallacy in philosophy of mind (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).11
In his book, Boundaries of the Mind, Wilson notes that many theorists do indeed
view cognition in this way. As he argues, this is because both individuals and their study are
11

According to this fallacy, ecologically minded thinkers are prone to jumping from the claim that two systems
x and y are coupled to each other, to the claim that x and y are parts of a larger system, z.
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disciplined in the Foucauldian sense by smallism in Western science, the idea that good
explanations of complex phenomena appeal to the proper parts they can be divided into.12
(p. 25, 2004). As he writes,
“[t]he governing assumption… is that the psychological abilities of interest
are those that can be assessed by probing an individual in abstraction from
not only her real life, social environment, but from any substantial social
environment… underwritten by the search for heritable biological factors
governing cognition… One reason… sometimes offered by psychologists
themselves in conversation, is that is just what psychological abilities are:
they are dispositions that individuals carry around with them from situation
to situation” (Wilson, p. 44, 2004; italics added).
Because psychological states are thought to supervene on physical states of the brain, then,
brain states are thought to exhaustively constitute cognitive phenomena. In other words, a
foundational part of the traditional picture concerns methodological individualism, the
thesis that psychological states should be understood “without reference to anything
beyond the boundary of the individual who has those states” (p. 10, 2004).13
Obviously, that the sciences of the mind trend this way by custom is no argument in
support of individualism. We might well think, like Boyd et al., Sterelny, Wilson, and
others, that at least some interesting psychological abilities, even when they belong to
individuals, are not bounded by them. This would be a more ecologically-minded move.
Ultimately, then, the traditional and ecological pictures make irreconcilable metaphysical
claims about where the mind is located and how its parts should be taxonomized. Either
cognitive systems reach into the body and world, or they are restricted to the brain, but not
both. This suggests a way in which we can discriminate between the two possibilities,
namely by assessing which metaphysical commitments are most plausible. If the
metaphysical assumptions of the traditional view are for some reason suspect, this would
provide reasons to favor an ecological picture.

12

Wilson defines smallism as “discrimination in favor of the small”, as for example, cells can be explained by
their chemical substances, chemicals by their atoms, atoms by their subatomic particles and so on.
13
In Wilson’s terminology, those who deny individualism are externalists (p. 10, 2004).
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Larry Shapiro, in his book The Mind Incarnate, questions two such traditional
metaphysical commitments; the separability thesis and the multiple realizability thesis
(2004). According to the separability thesis, the mind is a fairly self-contained organ that
can basically be understood without reference to the body. According to the multiple
realizability thesis, minds can be realized in many different kinds of brains, as whatever
constitutes a brain also constitutes a mind. Each of these claims stem from a functional
conception of the mind, where what makes something a mental state depends on its
functional role in the system of which it is a part.14 While one could easily make
functionalist claims about the mind without restricting themselves to the brain, these theses
are traditional in character because they do just that, seeing the mind as a sort of resident of
the skull.
In questioning separability and multiple realizability, Shapiro marshals evidence
from a number of roboticists and neuroscientists engaged in understanding and replicating
actual human cognitive mechanisms. As these researchers show, much of our complex
cognition, such as vision and bipedal motion15, is significantly embodied; it crucially relies
on the body to process information. Because it provides constraints on the shape of
cognition, Shapiro argues, the human body is more thoroughly integrated with the mind
than would make sense if separability were true. The actual physical arrangement of the
body and its connections to the brain are necessary elements of the information processing
system. Multiple realizability, in turn, is significantly less likely because the shape of the
physical brain at a neural level provides similar constraints (2004). If the embodiment
hypothesis is correct, then contrary to the external minimalism thesis, structures and
processes external to the skull indeed play a primary causal role for many psychological
abilities. We must make reference to things outside the skull in order to even understand

14

As it is with many other ecologically-minded arenas, the debate between classic computationalism and the
embodiment hypothesis in philosophy of mind, uses slightly different terminology than I use here. As I
summarize Shapiro and others I will continue to use the terms ‘traditional’ and ‘ecological’ in order to help
situate different views with respect to each other, and with respect to the traditional and ecological pictures.
15
Unfortunately there is little time to examine this research here. For more see Shapiro (2004), especially his
discussions of David Marr’s theory of vision, and Rodney Brooks’ work with passive-dynamic walkers.
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what human psychological abilities are.16 That is to say, the traditional view makes dubious
ontological commitments based on the evidence Shaprio presents.
Wilson makes a similar point, in his discussion of what it means for something to
be realized. To put it simply, for a system S to realize a property P, the state of S we refer
to must be metaphysically sufficient for producing or sustaining P. Viewed in this way,
human cognition is ‘widely’ realized; the computational systems under investigation in the
cognitive sciences extend beyond the boundaries of the body, as the components internal
to the skull are insufficient to produce P (2001; 2003; 2004).17 Because they are so located,
Wilson argues, the boundaries we draw around cognition should reflect this18—unless there
can be found “a plausible, non-question-begging way to individuate mental states
independent of their total realizations” (p. 179, 2004).19

16

Wilson provides a nice example of this way of thinking in his discussion of enactive representation, saying,
“[r]epresentation is not something implanted in individuals but something that individuals do by exploiting
the rich structures of their environments in cycles of perception and action” (p. 178, 2004). For an excellent
treatise on taking this dynamic stance in cognitive science, see Chemero (2009).
17
Zach Murphy has recently posited a novel and rigorous method for drawing boundaries around the mind
which plausibly extend beyond the body (Murphy, 2015). According to his Extended Scaffolded Mind (ESM)
thesis, scaffolding (understood as a more general notion than Sterelny’s above) “is the relationship holding
between two processes p1 and p2 such that when p1 scaffolds p2, p1 eases p2's processing demands”
(Murphy, p. 35, 2015). Using graph theory, we can chart the density scaffolding between any two processes.
Murphy then proposes that a process should be understood as part of a cognitive system “if the scaffolding it
contributes is not significantly divergent from the average [density of the system] being considered before its
inclusion” (p. 41, 2015). Murphy argues that, using his method, tools such as neuroprostheses are proper
parts of individual minds (2015).
18
For an intermediary view, see Rupert (2009).
19
The mistake the traditional picture seems to make here is in thinking that because cognitive systems are
widely realized, individuals must be as well. But this misses an important distinction between subjects and
systems. Systems, like of digestion or cognition, should be construed widely, as parts of these processes
‘extend into the world.’ Subjects on the other hand—the bearers or loci of the properties or processes—need
not be construed widely. Writes Wilson, “[i]n both species of externalism that I have discussed, the individual
remains the subject or bearer of psychological states even if she no longer serves as a boundary demarcating
the entities of a respectable psychological science” (p. 212, 2004).
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1.2.3 Empirical Arguments
Leaving aside both theory and the ancestral environment, how do contemporary human
beings actually think and act? Does anything about our observable behavior suggest that the
internal richness and external minimalism theses might be true? Some of the most
suggestive evidence for making the ecological turn comes from a flood of behavioral studies
investigating what is known as ‘dual process’ theories of cognition, according to which our
behavior is guided by two separate and often conflicting systems of cognition known by the
somewhat tongue-in-check names System 1 and System 2. On the dual process picture,
System 1 is fast, tacit, automatic, intuitive and unreflective, generating quick judgments and
actions based on heuristics and expert skills, while System 2 is slow, deliberate, and
controlled, producing the kinds of judgments associated with abstract reasoning
(Kahneman, 2011).
Of course, it seems perfectly reasonable, and not at all inconsistent with the
traditional picture that we should rely on System 1 at times. If we froze up and slowly
reasoned through the process of tying our shoes or choosing from all 60 kinds of breakfast
cereal at the supermarket, we would not be very effective creatures. But people rely on
System 1 much more often than might be expected. According to many philosophers, the
dual process literature reveals that humans do not generally behave in ways reflective of
deliberate, self-conscious, and principled reasoning. Quite the opposite is true. Minor
situational factors, priming effects, and implicit biases in perception and evaluation seem to
order much of our behavior. This creates trouble for the traditional picture, because
behaviors representative of agency are supposed to be those guided by conscious internal
reflection on our psychological states.
Worse, when it comes to tacit, quick thinking decisions procedures, we can harbor
implicit irrationalities as easily as we can harbor justified heuristics and decision
procedures.20 In fact, System 1 cognition often guides action in strange, dissociative ways
that come apart from explicitly endorsed beliefs. The Name Letter Effect, for example,
makes more likely that ‘Georgina’ moves to Georgia, and ‘Dennis’ becomes a dentist, than
anyone else (Nuttin, 1987), the Watching Eyes Effect makes it more likely that people do
20

For an extended treatment of this idea, see Brownstein (ms).
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the right thing, even when they know for a fact that they are not being observed, by the
blatant placement of images of eyes (Haley & Fessler, 2005), and Implicit Racial Bias
influences even avowed egalitarians to judge resumes headed by ‘black-sounding’ names
much harsher than those headed by ‘white-sounding’ names (Bertrand & Mullainathan,
2003).21 Subjects in these studies do not cite these effects as causal influences on their
behavior, but rather give explanations that make recourse to traditional, internal decision
making procedures. (Doris, 2002).
As Doris puts it, “[t]he empirical literature indicates that evidence of incongruence
is readily obtained across a wide variety of experimental protocols… taken together, these
observations make plausible the supposition that incongruence is widespread in everyday
life” (p. 61, 2015). He argues that this incongruence, the conflict between how we explain
our behavior and its actual causal antecedents, undermines the exercise of agency. Again,
as Sneddon argues, the pervasive influence of external features of our environments “does
not imply that beliefs, desires, and other proattitudes do not produce actions, but it does
imply that they alone do not produce actions” (p. 186, 2011). Indeed, it is hard to reconcile
this picture with the internal richness and external minimalism theses, as it suggests that our
cognition is for the most part driven by things outside the skull. One radical response to
this would be to conclude, as some do, that human beings just aren’t (or maybe are hardly
ever) agents in the traditional sense.22 But this is hardly necessary. Instead, as both Doris
and Sneddon argue, we should be motivated to endorse an approach to cognition and
agency that fits comfortably with the ecological picture.
1.3 The Ecological Picture
Though it runs under various names like Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and
Affective (4ae) cognition, ‘externalism’ with respect to the mind, or as Wilson calls it the
Temporally Extended, Scaffolded, and Embodied and Embedded (TESSE) view,
ecological thinking has influenced recent theories of human cognition in many domains.
And as is perhaps already clear, it has enjoyed an increasing influence in philosophy of

21
22

This literature is huge. For an excellent summary, see Doris (2002; 2015).
For example see Merritt (2000) or Ross (2002).
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mind. The most eloquent summation of the ecological picture, in my view, comes from the
work of philosopher Andy Clark. In his 2007 paper, “Soft-Selves and Ecological Control”,
he writes:
“[h]umans belong to the interesting class of what I'd like to call open-ended
ecological controllers. These are systems that seem to be specifically
designed so as to constantly search for opportunities to make the most of
body and world, checking for what is available, and then (at various timescales and with varying degrees of difficulty) integrating it deeply, creating
whole new unified systems of distributed problem-solving... in fact, human
agents seem highly engineered so as to be able quite generally to learn to
make maximal problem-simplifying use of an open-ended variety of
internal, bodily, or external sources of order. For example, we can learn to
use tools, sports racquets, and musical instruments in ways that exploit the
intrinsic dynamics of those material structures” (p. 103, 2007).
In other words, human beings are ecological agents. Ecological control is the kind of
control we exert, according to Clark, that,
“allows much of our skill at walking to reside in the linkages and elastic
properties of muscles and tendons. And it allows (I claim) much of our
prowess at thought and reason to depend upon the robust and reliable
operation, often (but not always) in dense brain-involving loops, of a variety
of non-biological problem-solving resources spread throughout our social
and technological surround” (p. 101, 2007).
Rather than micro-managing every detail of our action, our minds are uniquely
suited to create, calibrate, and exploit these loops of influence through our bodies and
worlds in the service of achieving personal goals, even though ecological control “is
devolved, distributed, diffuse, decentralized, often smeared out over time, and typically not
accompanied by the kind of rich consciousness awareness characteristic of higher level and
reflective cognition” (Holroyd & Kelly, forthcoming). It is agency in the realest sense. To

be a well-functioning agent is to successfully manage one’s cognitive ecology.
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In the remainder of section one I would like to briefly illustrate and elaborate on
the ecological picture using several recent philosophical projects that apply this perspective
to more specific areas of human cognition. The key idea will be to highlight three domains
over which ecological action of the type that Clark emphasizes is crucial to our
psychological well-functioning: our bodies, our social environments, and our physical
worlds. Taking ecological action to manipulate these arenas facilitates fluent and flexible
goal pursuit. This will prepare us for understanding actual therapeutic techniques in
ecological terms.
(1) We are embodied agents.—Ecological control over the body perhaps needs the least
elaboration, as much that is important to this domain is discussed alongside the
embodiment hypothesis. One thing that has not yet been mentioned, however, is how
we might deliberately shape our bodies, for example as basketball players train to
offload deliberate thinking about their jump shots, or nearsighted people may elect to
surgically reshape the lenses of their eyes to see more clearly. Fringe cases of this may
include the additions to our bodies, such as cochlear implants, deep-brain stimulation
devices, or even implants which extend our sensory perception to, for example, parts of
the non-visible light spectrum, or magnetic fields.
(2) We are mindshapers.—In Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human

Social Cognition, Tad Zawidzki argues that one of the ‘lynchpins’ underlying humans’
unique sociocognitive nature is our array of mindshaping mechanisms; those
mechanisms which drive imitation, pedagogy, irresistible conformism, norm institution,
enforcement, and narrative and self-constitution. On his picture, “[a]ny mechanism the
proper functioning of which is getting a target mind to match a model in certain
respects counts as mindshaping” (p. xvi, 2013). We are constantly aiming to get
ourselves and others to think and act in desirable ways.
The idea that individuals are continuously involved in mindshaping has many
interesting implications. For one, as Sneddon notes, there is an important sense in
which we literally share psychological processes with other people, insofar as we
participate in wide cognitive systems (p. 23, 2011). These scaffolding systems establish
norms of behavior in our social niches, by simultaneously interpreting and regulating
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how others act (Zawidzki, p. xiii, 2013). But they do not do so uniformly. For an
individual to exert ecological control in their social niches, then, may be as simple as
teaching a young child the rules of sharing toys. On the other hand, it may be as
complex as dealing with a traffic violation while travelling abroad. As Sneddon puts it,
“[o]ur moral minds are psychologically heterogeneous in part because they are
significantly widely realized and the world in which we operate is heterogeneous” (p.
204, 2011).
(3) We are environmental scaffolders.—In developing his scaffolded mind view, Sterelny
has much to say about how developmental environments are engineered by preceding
generations (2012). Everything from the stories we tell, to the toys we make available, to
the playgrounds and schools we design contains a wealth of information for our
children to absorb on their way to adulthood. But there are also everyday ways that
individuals manage their environments to reduce epistemic burdens and improve
cognitive performance. The ways we organize our kitchens (knives below the counter,
cups above the sink), media (my albums are grouped by genre then alphabetized by
artist name), and tools (ever wonder why keyboards are arranged ‘qwerty’-wise?) all
significantly reduce the costs of routine tasks. Imagine what life would be like if streets
weren’t numbered sequentially, if clocks weren’t synchronized, if pharmacies weren’t
reliably marked, or if you had to wander through the grocery store looking item by item
for the location of the Macintosh apples. Of course, many of these systems are already
in place in the environments young humans are born into, but many others have
emerged recently as solutions to novel problems (I am sure we all remember a time
before we could seek information on trending news topics by using ‘hashtags’).Thinking
of ecological control over the environment as cultural scaffolding is important, then, as
many of the systems we employ are replications of or improvements on systems used
by our ancestors (How long, for instance, have we been using some version of the
decimal counting system?).
2. Stewards of the Mind
As anyone who has ever tried to kick a habit or start a new routine already knows, changing
oneself for the better is more complicated than popular Western self-help ideologies would
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have you believe.23 Taking an ecological perspective on human cognition and agency is
revelatory as to why: both the tools at one’s disposal and the object of ones efforts are part
of a complex cognitive system that extends beyond the boundaries of the individual. Using
your mind to change your mind is not necessarily—or even principally—an inwardly focused
process. Viewed this way, the kind of control individuals have over their own minds is
‘indirect’; it is a process of managing cognitive ecology in the right way, shaping cognitive
resources beyond those internal to the skin and skull, shaping our bodies, our social
environments, and our physical worlds. Especially in a therapeutic context, then, it is useful
to see an individual’s role in managing her mental health as one of stewardship, a
responsible planning and management of cognitive ecology that benefits her mental wellbeing.
Before elaborating on this idea it will be beneficial to lay some groundwork. First,
in 2.1 I will briefly situate the ecological perspective in the literature on philosophy of
psychiatry by saying a little about what is meant by terms like ‘mental health’ and ‘mental
illness’. In 2.2, I will articulate how an ecological perspective can inform the ‘recipe for
change’ in psychiatric therapy, by demonstrating how various therapeutic techniques can be
understood as tools of ecological control. I will introduce a key piece of terminology,

agential technology, to refer to these kinds of tools. Finally, in 2.3 I will consider one
potential objection to my view, which questions whether psychiatric therapy as it is
practiced in the real world really needs an ecological reorientation.
2.1 An Ecological Understanding of Therapy
To start with a practical definition, the World Health Organization calls mental
health “a state of complete mental well-being, and not merely the absence of disease…
related to the promotion of well-being, the prevention of mental disorders, and the
treatment and rehabilitation of people affected by mental disorders” (WHO, 2015). Of
23

My favorite critique of this phenomenon comes from comedian Dave Chappelle on the popular self-help
book The Secret, which apparently claims that the one solution to getting what you want from life is ‘positive
thinking’. “Fly to Africa and try telling one of them starving children that…” Chappelle jokes, “What you need
to do is visualize some roast beef and some mashed potatoes and gravy… the problem is you have a bad
attitude about starving to death!” (Chappelle, 2007). By relying on the traditional picture, these views can
focus too narrowly on what’s inside the skin and skull, severely limiting their ability to help make people
better.

80

course, ‘complete mental well-being’ might be setting the bar a little high for most, but this
definition at least makes sense of the idea that even those not suffering from a particular
mental disorder might improve upon their psychological well-being. Promoting mental
health is as much about managing day-to-day stress as it is about preventing psychosis—one
can be healthy, and still might be healthier. I mean ‘being mentally ill’, then, to describe a
condition in which an individual's flourishing significantly impaired or limited by some
features of their psychology irrespective of what those features are.24
Therapeutic intervention in psychiatry is any measure taken to intervene on an individual’s
cognitive system and improve their well-being. Psychiatric therapy is ecological in nature
because the boundary of the mentally ill subject's cognitive system goes beyond the
individual—changes to the physical body, and the social and environmental niches are all
ways to effect that cognitive system.25 Still, we need not worry that we might be applying
terms like ‘mental illness’ in strange and objectionable ways, as long as mental illness
remains a property of individuals and not of cognitive systems. That is to say, the mentally
ill subject is the person I can point to on the therapist's couch, because they are the locus of
the mental illness. There is no making sense of pointing to, say, a broken educational
system or despotic government and saying ‘there’s mental illness here’. Further,
determining the health of someone's mental condition should be done with respect to that
individual’s well-being and nothing else.
2.2 Agential Technologies
From an ecological perspective on psychiatric therapy, therapeutic techniques are best
conceived of as a species of agential technologies; a set of often non-obvious methods and
strategies of control, whose pathway of influence over behavior and psychological
functioning often loops outside the boundaries of the skin and skull. In what follows I will
first say more about agential technologies in general, following Jules Holroyd and Dan
Kelly’s discussion of forms of ecological control in their forthcoming paper, “Implicit Bias,
Character, and Control”. I will then explain how therapeutic interventions specifically are

24
25

For a detailed discussion on how these terms are used here and in the literature, see previous chapters.
As will be demonstrated in great detail in section 3.
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of this kind—technologies of mental health—by surveying some contemporary methods for
improving psychological well-being.

2.2.1 The General Picture
In their insightful elaboration of Clark’s concept of ecological control, Holroyd and Kelly
note that there is an ambiguity in the idea of exerting ecological control that has not yet
been explored. Exerting ecological control might mean taking ecological control by, for
instance, purposefully organizing the files on your desktop. This puts a tool into place that
you can rely on at a later date in an exercise of ecological control (Holroyd & Kelly,

forthcoming). In the first case, you are co-opting your environment, using your lauded
system 2 skills in abstract reasoning and planning to structure your ecological niche. In the
second case, you are relying on previously deployed structure in order to bring your
behavior in line with your goals without the need for system 2 effort. As Holroyd and Kelly
put it, “[u]ltimately, a person can calibrate sub-systems that guide behavior until eventually
they operate, on their own, in precisely the way she wants them to operate, even when she
is not consciously and explicitly attending to them” (forthcoming).
These tools, structures, or subsystems which human beings create in taking
ecological control, and use in exercising it, are those previously mentioned ‘brain-involving
loops of influence’. They may recruit social, biological, or non-biological resources. They
can be as transparent to the user as a well-organized file system, but they may also work in
opaque and non-obvious ways—like an expert golf swing learned through imitation, or a
solution to a problem like implicit bias that must be discovered by careful empirical
research. Resources which exploit these loops are technologies of agency, supporting goal
directed cognition and behavior in situations where our internal resources may not be
enough.
Elaborating on their taking/exercising distinction, Holroyd and Kelly describe three
noteworthy kinds of agential technologies. First, there are ‘environmental props consciously
employed for guiding cognitive control’ (hereafter, environmental props). Deploying
environmental props is a way to take ecological control from the outside in, by making use
of environmental scaffolding and mindshaping. For example one can significantly weaken
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implicit racial biases by surrounding oneself with images of admired exemplars of the
stigmatized group, such as Billie Holiday and Malcom X (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001).
The images are environmental props. Next, there are ‘cognitive props consciously
employed for guiding cognitive processes’ (hereafter, embodied props). Embodied props
are a way of taking ecological control by shaping one’s own mind to indirectly guide
behavior at a later time from the inside out. To take the case of implicit prejudice again, the
use of implementation intentions has recently been shown to be an effective strategy for
managing the effects of implicit bias. As Holroyd and Kelly summarize, an individual
“might deliberately repeat to herself 'if I see a Black face, I will think ‘safe,’' practising this
line of thought enough that it becomes routine and automatic, thus defeating her implicit
racial bias” (see also: Webb, Sheeran, & Pepper 2010). An implementation intention is an
embodied prop. Finally there are ‘automatic processes as props unconsciously employed
for guiding cognitive processes’ (hereafter, embodied habits). Embodied habits are those
internal processes that allow one to guide behavior without having to actively take
ecological control. For instance, it has been shown that one’s commitment to egalitarian
goals, thankfully, mitigates the influence of implicit bias at least somewhat (see also:
Moskowitz & Li 2011). Egalitarian goals themselves, as automatically activated structures in
one’s cognitive ecology, can be thought of as an agential technologies as well (Holroyd &
Kelly, forthcoming).
To these three kinds, environmental props, embodied props, and embodied habits,
I would like to add a fourth kind of agential technology that might be usefully employed in
guiding behavior. What I’ll call cultural customs are ways we automatically guide our
behavior from the outside in using extant structures in our social environments and
physical worlds. We are born into niches with all kinds of useful scaffolding, both for
developing into competent adults, and for remaining competent through our lifetimes. To
take a rather tired example, consider all of the infrastructure in the United States that
supports driving on the right side of the road. Of course, there is no reason why the entire
citizenry of the state of Illinois couldn’t agree tomorrow that left-sided driving suits them
better. As long as everyone was doing it, left-sided driving would be no better or worse
efficiency and safety wise than right-sided driving… except for one thing. All of the road
paint, traffic signs, and other signals we rely on to direct us—especially when we are perhaps
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not being completely attentive—are engineered for driving on the right. The sheer scale of
effort it would take to reorganize all of this infrastructure makes the switch infeasible. This
infrastructure is an important agential technology, a method of controlling our behavior
that relies on things external to the skin and skull.
With the addition of cultural customs, it becomes clear how agential technologies
can be categorized simultaneously by domain and by the taking/exercising distinction. In
figure 1, I have organized the four types of agential technologies in a matrix. Along the xaxis, they are categorized by instances of consciously taking versus automatically exercising
ecological control. Along the y-axis, they are categorized by the domain of ecological
action; action over the body, or ‘inside out’, and over the non-bodily, physical or social
environment, or ‘outside in’. In what follows, I will examine how a number of
contemporary therapeutic techniques fit into this matrix.

taking EC

exercising EC

body

embodied props

embodied habits

non-body

environmental props

cultural customs

Figure 1: Agential Technologies

2.2.1 Technologies of Mental Health
The goal of this section is to motivate the stewardship picture by interpreting contemporary
therapeutic techniques as agential technologies. The categories are meant merely as helpful
partitions in the current landscape.
(1) Villages—One longstanding method of mental health management and care involves
finding habitats and social circles that facilitate well-being, whether by fostering solitude
or community, eliminating risks or dangers, reducing or increasing stimulation, or
providing specialized care. For the treatment of mental and developmental disorders in
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particular, the tradition of relocation to a better suited environment goes back at least as
far as 700 years ago, when the town of Geel in Belgium began taking in ‘boarders’ from
across Europe. Simply living in a safe and caring home significantly improved sufferers’
symptoms compared with those left in the charge of the prisons and institutions of the
time (Jay, 2014). Hospitals, rehab facilities, and specialized schools are modern
examples of these spaces; each institution is ideally intended to provide particular
environmental props and customs designed for therapeutic change. In addition, some
interested in long-term care for sufferers of Alzheimer’s and dementia have recently
begun planning and implementing enclosed ‘villages’ and other infrastructures to
maximize safety and independence. For example, there is a bus stop outside Benrath
Senior Center in Düsseldorf where no busses ever stop in order to help calm potential
wanderers (de Quetteville, 2008), and a ‘dementia-focused living center’ in Weesp,
Holland where the apartments and shops are designed to reflect familiar times and the
caretakers wear ‘street clothes’ (Campbell-Dollaghan, 2014). These facilities combine
many different cultural customs in order to facilitate the well-being and self-sufficiency
of their residents, making the village a technology of mental health.
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Figure 2: “Outdoor space plan for nursing home De Hogeweyk”, by Niek Roozen
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(2) Self-help organizations—Sometimes known as ‘12 step programs’, self-help
organizations are a source of controversy, especially in the United States, where
programs like Alcoholics Anonymous can be religious in nature, and are often the only
affordable option for those negotiating court-ordered treatment for substance abuse
(Ruiz, 2014; Glaser, 2015). Research suggests that AA is not the only, or even the most
effective treatment for addiction. Still, there are those who undeniably claim that it has
helped them (Singal, 2015). There are likely several explanations for this. First,
regardless of the specific program, choosing to join a social circle where members are
committed to specific goals, like remaining sober, is an effective mindshaping
technique. This is because having trusted mentors and sponsors, as well as having
community members with shared experiences, are effective environmental props.
Indeed, sociality is, in general, a powerful influence on mental health (Alexander,
2001). Second, in addition to structuring the social environment, those in self-help
organizations are often engaged in a kind of restructuring of their values and
commitments, using certain creeds and rituals as embodied props to control behavior.
Understood, on a traditional view, as a mere use of ‘willpower’ it would be mysterious
as to why not all addicts who strive to curb their addiction are not equally successful.
(3) Psychotherapy—Behavioral therapy, cognitive-behavioral therapy, emotion-focused and
psychodynamic psychotherapy all follow a familiar cultural trope in the West: patient
and therapist sit across from each other in a comfortable room, and discuss the
patient’s mental well-being. Depending on the particular modality, there are different
theoretical reasons for engaging in this process—discovering repressed memories and
feelings and forging new emotional associations are just two.26 However, as Doris puts it,
“[t]herapists’ theoretical predilections have relatively little to do with client outcomes,
and the means by which therapy works are imperfectly understood” (p. 124, 2015).
This may not come as welcome news for those seeking a ‘sure-fire cure’. From an
ecological perspective, however, the idea that patient-therapist relationships facilitate
positive change while not providing complete or permanent ‘cures’ for mental

26

While there is confusion as to why, the current consensus seems to be that ‘talk therapy’, regardless of
particular modality, works. For more see Lane et al. (2015), Lambert and Ogles (2004), Cozolino (2002),
Luborsky et al. (1985), and Seligman (1993).
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disorders is obvious. Psychotherapy does not instantaneously remove the underlying
cause of any symptoms, but is rather one more tool in a steward of the mind’s arsenal,
an environmental prop which may provide crucial social support. Indeed, there is good
evidence that “a ‘positive alliance’ between therapist and client is associated with
positive outcomes” across modalities (p. 124, Doris, 2015). Further, a therapist may
make specific recommendations for a patient to restructure their work and home lives,
providing additional technologies of mental health to combat particular illnesses.
(4) Psychoactive drugs27—Modifying ones neurochemistry is an effective tool of ecological
control for many people. As a deliberate method of reorganizing body chemistry,
psychoactive drugs are a kind of embodied prop. Another, more recently rediscovered
dimension to the therapeutic use of psychoactive drugs involves the guided use of
psychedelics like LSD and psilocybin. Professor of psychiatry Rolland Griffiths
describes this kind of therapy as a kind of “inverse PTSD”; these drugs generate
increased connectivity in brain regions which do not normally connect for a discrete
period of time, during which the rigid patterns of thinking that characterize addiction
and compulsions may be disrupted and replaced (Pollan, 2015). Electing to take such a
‘trip treatment’ is a clear way of managing cognitive ecology from the inside out. In the
right circumstances, psychedelics are embodied props. Finally, recent research
indicates that probiotics targeting your gut are significantly psychoactive. Not only does
early development of the microbiome play a role in mental health, but changing gut
bacteria in adults can significantly change behavior (Arnold, 2013). It is conceivable that
there will be an increase in the use of probiotics as technologies of mental health in the
future.
(5) Recent innovations—With recent advances in surgical techniques, robotic engineering,
and even graphics engines, a number of unconventional psychiatric interventions have
27

I don’t wish to wade too deeply into the controversy surrounding the use of prescription medications, and
the influence of the pharmaceutical industry. Elsewhere I have written about the problematic effects of
industry on prescription practices (Washington & Morar, forthcoming). Suffice it to say that, while the impact
of money on medicine is complex and deeply entrenched, there is no reason to think that the use of drugs
like anti-depressants, stimulants, mood stabilizers, or even pain medications have no place in psychiatric
therapy. In a both crude and eloquent response to a particularly virulent strain of anti-anti-depressant
discourse in US politics, blogger John Dolan opines that, “[d]rugs in contemporary America are like
prostitutes in Victorian Europe: Life could not go on without them, everyone depends on them one way or
another, but no one ever thanks them. They don’t fit in with the global lie we tell about this life” (2014).
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developed over the past few decades which are worth highlighting. To start, brain
stimulation therapies have evolved far beyond so-called ‘electroshock’ therapy.28 Vagus
nerve stimulation devices are currently used to treat epilepsy and mood disorders,
electrodes placed within the brain to treat Parkinson’s disease are being studied as
treatments for depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and transcranial magnetic
stimulation is also being studied for depression and psychosis (NIMH, 2015). Perhaps
more remarkable are the number of videogames in development as potential
treatments for everything from post-traumatic stress to attention deficit disorders and
age related-cognitive decline (Brooks, 2013; Bluestein, 2014; Couch, 2015).
One thing to note about the therapeutic techniques listed so far, is that they often have a
social or relational dimension. Perhaps you can be relied upon to take your medications by
yourself and on schedule, but there is no therapy without a therapist, no deep brain
stimulation without a surgeon, and no rehab facility without caretakers or supporters. This
introduces an interesting dimension of other-directedness to therapeutic intervention.
Sometimes we act so as to manage our own mental health but sometimes we act for others.
Even when not actively occupying a social role like that of a clinician, human beings can
have a substantial impact on the cognitive ecology of our fellows.
The implication of social engineering does not strike me as particularly
problematic. In the context of raising children for instance, such engineering is not only
uncontroversial, but expected. The number of choices parents must make in arranging
their child’s developmental environment for optimal mental health is astonishing, and it
only grows as we learn more about the mind and brain. It is now speculated for instance
that frequent school moves increase the risk for psychiatric symptoms (Singh, 2014), that
strong adult relationships are a key ingredient in resilience (Walsh, 2015), that music
lessons aid emotional intelligence while bilingualism reduces essentialist intuitions (Nutt,

28

It is perhaps not well known that ectroconvulsive therapy today is still widely used, and considered a safe
and effective treatment method for medication resistant depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia
(NIMH, 2015)
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2015; Byers-Heinlein & Garcia, 2014), and that frequent use of handheld devices like
cellphones may delay development (Lin et al., 2012; Rowan, 2015).29
The point is well taken, however, that there is risk in conceiving of some otherdirected tools of ecological control as technologies of mental health. It is quite possible that
any attempt to order another person, or group of peoples’ behavior may be detrimental
because it is paternalist. But this should not stop us from promoting any particular
therapeutic techniques.30 In my view, no process is therapeutic unless it succeeds at
bettering its target. What is meant by ‘better’ is a fascinating topic for another time.31
2.3 Theory vs. Reality
So far, I have argued that an ecological perspective on the human mind is crucial for
understanding the recipe for therapeutic change in clinical psychiatry. It explains that
change occurs when one’s cognitive ecology is suitably altered. Managing cognitive ecology
is best understood as a process of ecological control. As stewards of the mind, we manage
and intervene on mental well-being using technologies of mental health, causally and
functionally integrated chains of resources through which human beings act as agents in the
management of mental health.
When one steps away from theory and examines clinicians in the real world,
however, there is a certain, perfectly understandable objection, not to the specific details of
my view, but to its novelty. Of course psychiatric therapy is ecological in character, the
thought goes, diet, exercise, work and home life are all normally addressed in many

different therapeutic contexts. Mental health practitioners have known for years that an
attempt to ameliorate the suffering of mental illness without also addressing these things is
fruitless. This is already how it’s done.
Is contemporary psychiatric therapy, in general or in part, ecologically-minded?
This is a difficult determination to make, given the wide variety of contexts in which
psychiatric therapies are practiced. I am doubtful that clinicians across contexts—including
29

These studies are all extremely new and shouldn’t be accepted at face value, but I take it that the point
remains that childrearing in a rapidly changing world is immensely complex.
30
For interesting perspectives on how government agencies and aid organizations can support psychological
well-being see Coster (2014) and SAMHSA (2015). For a more conservative view see Evans (2013).
31
See previous chapters.
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social workers, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and others—are of one mind on this,
given how often particular interventions are emphasized as a ‘one true cure’ for all.
Additionally, it is important to remember just how pervasive the traditional picture of the
mind is in the West.32
In any case, a review of the literature makes plain that psychiatric researchers, who
often focus on mechanistic explanation for one particular diagnosis, have a kind of
traditionalist bias. As philosophers Kari Theuer and Daniel Hartner put it,
“[a] central aim of some current empirical research on psychiatric disorders
is to link the clusters of symptoms listed in diagnostic manuals with the
underlying neurobiological mechanisms that sustain the symptom clusters
characteristic of the disorder. For example, much of the research on autism
is directed toward uncovering the genetic, developmental, and
neuroanatomical mechanisms that underlie the disorder in all autism cases

or in relevant subgroups Autism is by no means unique in this regard:
research on anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, schizophrenia, and
many others can be similarly characterized” (Theuer & Hartner, 2015;
italics added).
In other words, much current research proceeds under the assumption that one causal
pathway realized inside the brain is the all things considered underlying explanation for a
particular kind of illness. Taking into account the significant influence that variations in an
individual’s cognitive ecology can have casts doubt on this idea. I do not want to argue that
intervention on a particular causal pathway without regard for others is never the best
avenue for treatment for a particular individual, but again, this cannot be determined in
abstraction from an individual’s context. To fully understand what the options even are, in
any particular case, research must proceed with a wide enough focus to take the entire
cognitive ecology into account. When searching for therapeutic interventions, it is crucial to
keep this in mind, or else risk severe limitations on our basic understanding of what it is to
In his book Trying Not to Try, Edward Slingerland makes a persuasive argument on ecological grounds
that, when it comes to the difficulties of self-improvement, “[a] growing literature suggests that Chinese
thinkers living more than 2000 years ago has a much more accurate picture of how people really think and
behave than we find in recent Western philosophy or religious thought” (p. 10, 2014).
32
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be mentally ill, and what to do about it.33 We should be wary of narrowly focused, ‘cure all’
therapies, as well as those which misconstrue human agency. I will expand on this idea in
the next section of this paper.
3. Learning to Be Better
The ecological picture of the mind gives us new tools to explain the success or failure of
prescriptions for improving psychological well-being, and to generate new and improved
therapies. Successful prescriptions tend to add to our repertoire as stewards of the mind,
rather than draw boundaries around it. They take into account individual’s uniquely human
nature as embodied, and socially situated creatures. Successful prescriptions are compatible
with the empirical findings of the sciences of the mind and human behavior.34 On the
contrary, I am optimistic that broadening our understanding of psychiatry and psychiatric
therapy along ecological lines will afford promising breakthroughs in the fight to alleviate
suffering caused by mental illness. In 3.1 I hope to take one small step toward validating
that optimism by showing how a number of proposals from the philosophical and
psychological literature fare on ecological grounds. Then in 3.2, I will demonstrate how the
stewardship view manifests itself as practical guidance and advice for individuals.
3.1 Avenues toward Mental Well-Being
Universal solutions can be as attractive as unifying explanations. In a forthcoming article in

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, for example, Raffael Kalisch, Marianne B. Müller, and
Oliver Tüscher propose that mental health ultimately depends on a single unifying
mechanism which protects against stress and mediates resilience, namely, the style in which
someone evaluates and reacts to a challenge. Healthy organisms ‘make the best of things’
or ‘bounce back’. Kalisch et al. call this the positive appraisal style theory of resilience
(PASTOR) account. As I have argued elsewhere, one plausible reading of PASTOR that
remains consistent with an ecological view of cognition construes ‘positive appraisal’ as
33

This is yet another place, it seems, to push a critique of contemporary research as exemplified by the DSM.
See Hacking (2013) for a similar view.
34
I reject, in other words, the worry Sneddon expresses at the end of his book, that a ‘wide’ view of human
cognition has little practical promise for therapy.
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positive affective or psychophysiological response relative to stressor load, normalized to
individuals’ actual performance in the face of various stimuli; a resilient organism makes
the best of its circumstances, whether challenging or routine (Washington, 2015). For
example, a resilient human being can shrug off negative feelings after a difficult workday,
remain optimistic after a disappointing election result, or move on after a personal loss.
Strengthening one’s ability to ‘make the best of it’, then, is the shape that therapy takes on
this view.
It is perhaps already clear how limiting this view might be in a therapeutic context.
While it seems uncontroversial that you might be a bit more stressed out when making a
life-altering decision such as whether or not to get married or quit your job than you would
choosing between busy checkout lines in a crowded store, these are not the only, or even
conceivably the most important dimensions along which stressor load varies. To put it
plainly, not all human beings are out there making the best of the same kinds of
circumstances. There are systemic disparities in the dangers we face, and the resources we
have to face them. Regardless of how resilient an individual might be, it is possible that
resilience mechanisms inevitably will collapse in some difficult, but commonplace
environments (Washington, 2015).35
What Kalisch et al. seem to miss, other than the gravity of economic inequality, is
the degree to which mental health depends on a widely realized cognitive ecology. Indeed,
by claiming that socioenvironmental factors are merely distant influences on mental health,
they buy into a version of the traditional picture, and blind themselves to the limits of
positive appraisal. PASTOR, so far, has little to say about how things like environmental
props and cultural customs can mitigate suffering caused by mental illness.
Not all reject the therapeutic significance of social and environmental scaffolding
however. Ulman Lindenberger and Ulrich Mayr, for instance, are two psychologists
interested in the value of technologies designed to assist aging individuals, such as
smartphones and ‘smart kitchens’ (2014). Noting that reliance on environmental cues
increases as human beings age, they argue that there is a “dark side” to environmental
35

In marginalized populations for whom mental health is a crucial concern, systemic inequality raises the
magnitude of everyday environmental stressors, and limits many social support based stress-aversion strategies
(Satcher, 2001). The most serene and resilient among us may be making the best possible lemonade out of
life’s lemons, and still be suffering
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support—that “this shift also comes at a cost, as the affordances of the environment
increasingly dominate the structure and content of thought and behavior” (p. 7, 2014) and
that “[older adults are] less capable of directing behavior in a top-down, internally regulated
manner” (p. 12, 2014). Interestingly, Lindenberger and Mayr seem to conclude that
environmental scaffolding is a danger that can hinder goal pursuit and engender loss of
autonomy, by distracting older individuals from the details of a particular task (2014).
Maintaining mental health, on their picture, is largely a matter of maintaining internal
control.
Of course, by proceeding under the traditionally-minded assumption that only
internal, top-down, deliberative, reasoning results in ‘proper’ control, Lindenberger and
Mayr overlook the fact that exercising ecological control can and does advance goal pursuit.
From an ecological perspective, it should be no surprise that humans rely more on
environmental cues in situations of compromised top-down control. This is exactly the
kind of flexibility that allows fluent goal pursuit across a variety of circumstances. For
example, as someone who often forgets about mundane tasks of day-to-day living
(especially under the stress of deadline pressure!) I am very grateful for the to-do list
capabilities of my phone. It gives me greater ability to pursue the goals I value, like taking a
daily medication. When I respond to the notification charm by getting up from my desk
and pouring a glass of water, I am exercising ecological control. Of course, if this task isn’t
one that is personally important to you, you shouldn’t be following my phone reminders.
Thus, while alarm over the negative influence of assistive technologies is
unwarranted, Linendberger and Mayr do well to point out the need for caution as regards
their design. Much, careful, empirical research and system 2 thinking is required to create
technologies of mental health which correspond to the needs and goals of individuals,
rather than sidetracking them. This idea highlights a feature common to many ecologicallyminded therapeutic proposals: that psychiatric therapy is, ideally, as highly individualized as
the needs and goals of the agents who engage in it. Individual variation, especially variation
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in cognitive ecology, entails variation in the ways we achieve, maintain, and improve mental
health. 36 As philosopher Dan Haybron puts it in his book The Pursuit of Unhappiness,
“[o]ur propensities for being happy or unhappy in various ways of living are
important to who we are. This matters, I argue, because it seems important
to live in accordance with who we are: well-being consists partly in fulfilling
our emotional natures” (p. 22, 2008).37
While not concerned with mental illness specifically, philosopher Valerie Tiberius
also grapples with the complexities of individual variation in the process of changing
oneself for the better in her account of living well (2008). According to her Reflective
Wisdom Account, a well-lived life is guided by the values which stand up to appropriate,
first-personal reflection. Of course, these values will not necessarily be the same for every
human being. Part of the difficulty then, which Tiberius recognizes, is not just deciding how
to behave unreflectively according to ones values, but knowing whether or not those values
are legitimate, or tell the whole story. To combat this, Tiberius suggests that we cultivate
certain virtues—we must be flexible, self-aware, optimistic, and have perspective on our lives
in order to be sure what we really value (2008).
This argument can be easily modified to provide a recipe for therapeutic change, of
another kind. Taking an active role in the management of one’s own mental health
requires a similar kind of wisdom. As stewards of the mind, some knowledge of the lay of
our cognitive ecology is critical to understanding what therapeutic techniques will have the
greatest impact. Investigating what we should ideally know in this regard is an important
avenue for future research, both as members of the human species, and as individuals
embedded in locally specific cultural contexts. Some of the specifics, of course, will evolve
over time, as our environments change and our knowledge of them expands. In the next
section, I will take a brief look at some of the best, current advice.

36

I make a similar points about variation in both ways of being ill and ways of being healthy in previous
chapters.
37
Interestingly, Haybron goes on to argue that there are fewer ways for human beings to live happily than one
might intuitively think (2008).
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3.2 Your Mental Health Niche
From a traditional perspective, it can sometimes seem as if mentally healthy individuals are
benefiting from equal parts wisdom and providence. Whether or not someone has or
develops a mental disorder is often thought of as bad genes, bad karma, or bad luck.
Dealing with misfortunes like these has also traditionally been an inward-focused process—
deep reflection, will power, and perhaps the occasional pharmaceutical drug tend to be the
recognizable tools at hand (Saks, 2013). This is somewhat unfortunate for those with a
practical interest in managing mental health, as it prevents many everyday methods
uncovered by recent research from being seen as ‘real’ therapeutic techniques.
Psychiatrist Elyn R. Saks agrees. Diagnosed with schizophrenia as a young college
student, and frequently hospitalized for a number of subsequent years, Saks was given a
grave prognosis. Doctors told her that she should expect not to hold a steady job. Today,
Saks is a chaired professor at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law,
an adjunct in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of California San Diego, a
faculty member of the New Center for Psychoanalysis, and a MacArthur genius. Interested
in what separates high-functioning schizophrenics like her from others, Saks gathered and
interviewed twenty subjects of diverse backgrounds, who were all educated professionals
living with the diagnosis (Saks, 2013). In an essay called ‘Successful and Schizophrenic’,
Saks describes these interviews in a passage worth quoting at length:
“How had these people with schizophrenia managed to succeed in their
studies and at such high-level jobs? We learned that, in addition to
medication and therapy, all the participants had developed techniques to
keep their schizophrenia at bay. For some, these techniques were cognitive.
An educator with a master’s degree said he had learned to face his
hallucinations and ask, ‘What’s the evidence for that? Or is it just a
perception problem?’ Another participant said, ‘I hear derogatory voices all
the time… you just gotta blow them off.’
Part of vigilance about symptoms was ‘identifying triggers’ to
‘prevent a fuller blown experience of symptoms’, said a participant who
works as a coordinator for a nonprofit group. For instance, if being with
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people in close quarters for too long can set off symptoms, build in some
alone time when you travel with friends.
Other techniques that our participants cited included controlling
sensory inputs. For some, this meant keeping their living space simple (bare
walls, no TV, only quiet music), while for others it meant distracting music.
‘I’ll listen to loud music if I don’t want to hear things,’ said a participant who
is a certified nurse’s assistant. Still others mentioned exercise, a healthy diet,
avoiding alcohol and getting enough sleep. A belief in God and prayer also
played a role for some.
One of the most frequently mentioned techniques that helped our
research participants manage their symptoms was work. ‘Work has been an
important part of who I am,’ said an educator in our group. ‘When you
become useful to an organization, there’s a certain value in belonging there.’
This person works on the weekends too because of ‘the distraction factor’.
In other words, by engaging in work, the crazy stuff often recedes to the
sidelines.
Personally, I reach out to my doctors, friends, and family whenever
I start slipping, and I get great support from them. I eat comfort food (for
me, cereal) and listen to quite music. I minimize all stimulation. Usually
these techniques, combined with more medication and therapy, will make
the symptoms pass. But the work piece—using my mind—is my best defense.
It keeps my demons at bay. My mind, I have come to say, is both my worst
enemy and my best friend.
That is why it is so distressing when doctors tell their patients not to
expect or pursue fulfilling careers. Far too often, the conventional
psychiatric approach to mental illness is to see clusters of symptoms that
characterize people. Accordingly, many psychiatrists hold the view that
treating symptoms with medication is treating mental illness. But this fails to
take into account individuals’ strengths and capabilities, leading mental
health professionals to underestimate what their patients can hope to
achieve in the world” (Saks, 2013).
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To my mind, a tacit acceptance of the traditional picture, especially the external
minimalism thesis, is largely to blame for this problem. Recall that, according to this thesis,
structures and processes external to an individual play at best a secondary causal role in the
development of a strong, healthy mind. Perhaps the most immediate benefit of taking an
ecological perspective on therapy, then, is in taking advantage of its much wider set of
practical tools and techniques. Not all of these will necessarily be effective for all
individuals, but they apply generally enough that adding them to the common lexicon
should be a great advantage.
By way of demonstration, consider first the ways in which we take care of our
physical bodies that affect our psychological well-being. It is more or less common
knowledge that one of the best things you can do for yourself to manage stress and be more
effective is to eat well, sleep well, exercise, and meditate (for more, see: Babyak et al., 2000;
Dweck, 2007; De Brigard, 2015). As has already been mentioned, diet is about more than
nutrition; it is also the way you care for the bacteria living in your gut. Recently, however, it
has been noted that over-sterilization and use of anti-bacterial products, especially in the
US, has had a negative effect on microbiota, and contributed to anxiety, obesity, and
depression (Rosenberg, 2014). Cutting back on use of hand-sanitizer, perhaps
counterintuitively, has become an important part of being mentally healthy. Equally
counterintuitive is the insight that smiles and laughter aren’t just expressions of happiness,
but ways of cultivating it. Even if forced, the mechanical action of smiling is a way of
elevating mood, from the outside in (Strack et al., 1988).
There are also a number of techniques for shaping minds and social spaces that can
benefit mental health. Again, beginning with the obvious, human beings generally benefit
from listening well, conversing deeply, giving to others, and staying in touch with friends
(Dunn et al., 2008; Mehl & Vazire, 2010; Baumeister et al., 2013). It is less widely known
that cynicism, a quality sometimes celebrated as an asset, has been linked to both heart
disease and dementia (Tolppanen, 2014), or that the kind of deep rumination about
negative feelings often advised in popular self-help books in fact makes depressive
symptoms worse (Rottenberg, 2014). On the other hand, expressions of positivity and selfexpressive acts, even when routinized, can be a great benefit to mental stability. Repeating
three things you are grateful for, or doing a ‘random act of kindness’ each day, for example,
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can have a lasting positive effect (Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Lyubomirsky et al.,
2005), as can journaling and other kinds of self-expressive writing (Gortner et al., 2006).
Finally, where possible, it is beneficial to arrange your physical environment in
certain ways. For one, it is now thought that chronic stress causes long-term changes in the
brain, which can predispose one to anxiety and mood disorders (Chetty, 2014). Regulating
noise, temperature, and crowding in the workplace are everyday ways to combat this.
Spending time outside and listening to music are also effective ways of reducing stress
(Ryan et al., 2010; Sherman et al., 2010). And reducing the time spent in front of screens,
especially before bed, is also becoming an increasingly urgent issue in our modern,
nocturnal, media-saturated lives (Lin et al., 2012).
For many, implementing all these therapeutic techniques at once will not be enough
to ameliorate their symptoms, without perhaps therapy or medication. Sometimes, there is
no known solution whatsoever. Still, for many others, ecological solutions are not known or
trusted as methods of psychiatric care—and it is this latter problem that most concerns me
here. Whether attending therapy or starting a regimen of probiotics, bettering oneself is an
ecological process. It requires attending to a wide cognitive system, deeply integrated with
the outside world, often via methods that do not look much like the work of Rodin’s
thinker. As a philosopher this is welcome news; my reflective skills are probably of better
use elsewhere anyway!
4. Concluding Remarks: Better Than Well, and Smarter Than We Think
Not everyone reflexively resists the idea that there is more to the mind than the contents of
the skin and skull.38 One public defender of ecological ideas worth mentioning is science
writer Clive Thompson. In his recent book Smarter than You Think, Thompson defends
the idea that integrating advanced technologies like movie preference algorithms and
search engines into our cognitive landscapes is not only acceptable or natural, but in many
ways an improvement on our abilities and selves (Thompson, 2013). There are also those
who are sympathetic to the idea that human enhancement, of which the process of

38

For example, some philosophers of psychiatry worry that psychiatric therapies somehow change our human
nature by making us “technological beings” (Phillips, 2013).
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psychiatric therapy is often an example, is no less natural or immoral than any other kind
of change. In his book, Better than Well, Carl Elliott argues that in fact, at least in
contemporary discourse in the United States, people are actually surprisingly open to the
idea of enhancement. As he puts it,
“…our ambivalence about so many enhancement technologies is often
ambivalence about the kinds of people we want to be. The question is not
just whether there is any moral cost to the quest to become better, but
whether there is any moral cost to the quest to become different. If we have
mixed feelings about accent-reduction clinics, cosmetic surgery, or Prozac,
this is partly because we have mixed feelings about the visions of the good
life these technologies serve” (p. 17, 2003, italics in original).
This complicated intersection of ideas—between agency, and wellness, and human
nature—often gets cached out in terms of values, in the philosophical literature. We have
taken for granted until now that there is inherent value in reducing or eliminating the
burden of mental illness, which is what makes psychiatric therapy an easy case. But figuring
out how therapy is best realized often involves negotiating a wider landscape of valuing—
and values can conflict.
At a first gloss, one is a successful agent when one is in some sense self-directed, or
acting in line with ones values. Perhaps, if those values stand up to some appropriate
standards, and an individual succeeds in realizing them, then ‘mentally healthy’ is just a way
to describe that individual.39 This is something I would like to investigate in the future. For
now, it is important to note one thing that we as humans cannot do. We cannot simply stop
being ecological agents. According to the ecological picture, what I have called a ‘special
kind of opportunity’ or ability to change in a goal-directed manner, is not just an interesting
quirk of human cognition, but characteristic of it. As Clark writes, we are ‘soft-selves’
which,
“set long-term goals, pursue some slow deliberative reasoning, and gently
nudge the larger system in certain directions, all the while actively creating

39

For more on agency and valuing see Doris (2015) and Tiberius (2008).
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and maintaining the kinds of conditions in which the overall distributed
cognitive economy performs at its best,” (p. 110, 2007).
Sometimes, that process of stewardship involves annexing different elements, biological
and non-biological, into the machinery of our minds. Sometimes we do this because we are
sick. Sometimes we do this because we are well.

101

5. OPEN QUESTIONS

In this project I have closely examined the nature of good clinical reasoning in clinical
psychiatry, thinking about mental illness and mental health which:
(1) is consilient with the other sciences of the mind/brain, and
(2) employs a normative theory with properly justified evaluative standards for psychiatric
diagnosis.
Over the course of my three primary chapters, I gave three criteria for good clinical
reasoning in psychiatry. Clinical psychiatry should:
(1) strictly separate its descriptive and evaluative projects into two stages, such that notions
of typicality do not delimit the class of mental disorders,
(2) respect variation in what makes individuals flourish by locating mental health in the
concerns of individual patients, and
(3) take advantage of the unique insights of an ecological perspective of the mind in order
to help teach us how to be better, mentally.
In the space that remains, I would like to gesture at some open questions surrounding my
arguments and highlight avenues for future research. Ultimately, I hope that extending this
project will help shape future discussions on the nature of mental illness.

1. Why Well-Being?
In chapter two I argued that the kind of normative theory of mental illness a two-stage
methodology requires would not need information about what psychological features and
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processes are typical or atypical for human beings or any subset thereof, and further, that a
completely descriptive taxonomy of cognitive mechanisms would be sufficient for theorists
and clinicians at stage two. Though not stated explicitly, I take these claims to be
substantiated by my arguments in chapter three. Since a theory which differentiates mental
health from mental illness must be grounded in the concerns of individuals, the very notion
of typicality with respect to a group loses its explanatory power. One might imagine that
examining a patient’s symptoms in a clinical context will reveal both whether they are
flourishing on their own terms, and if not, whether any typical psychological deviation
underlies that condition. This process is of course nothing like how diagnosis is conducted
using the DSM. As Kathryn Tabb has recently put it, the integration of psychiatric
knowledge into therapeutics will need to be re-imagined” (Tabb, ms).
At the end of chapter three I intimated that exactly what the right normative theory
is for mental illness has yet to be established. As per my references to concepts like
flourishing and well-being, I am in agreement with those theorists who believe that health is
properly located among these and other concepts of the good life. I am interested in wellbeing in particular, because of the recent successes in psychology of measuring it
objectively. Thus a further step to make is to engage with thinkers like Dan Haybron
(2008), Valerie Tiberius (2008; 2014), Erik Angner (2009), Anna Alexandrova (2013;
2015) and Michael Bishop (2015), to determine whether these measures are valid, and
what they have to reveal about mental health.
As measures of well-being are tied closely with values satisfaction, I believe that a
theory of mental health can be established along the same lines as Tiberius and Plakias’
values-based theory of well-being (2010). If a person is flourishing with respect to their
values, then they are healthy, or something to that effect. The notion of values I have in
mind here has much in common with Tiberius’ (2008), and also with John Doris’ notion in
his recent work on agency (2015). As Doris puts it, values are “associated with desires that
exhibit some degree of strength, duration, ultimacy, and non-fungibility, while playing a
determinative-justificatory role in planning” (think, friendship, family, independence, safety,

creativity) (p. 28, 2015).
One upshot of a view like this, if it can be substantiated, is its synchronicity with an
up and coming technique in clinical psychiatry called values-based practice (Fulford & Van
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Staden, 2013). Values-based practice is “a new skills based approach to working with
complex and conflicting values in health care that is proving to be a fast growing force at the
practical cutting edge of the philosophy of psychiatry” (p. 385, 2013). This method is
individualist in that it recognizes and accepts difference in individuals’ preferences and
concerns, and that these differences will underscore differences in ways of being mentally
ill (2013). Of course, the convergence of these concepts—well-being and values—suggests
that one way to mediate mental health is by changing individuals’ interests themselves. I
hinted at this possibility at the end of the second chapter, and further argument is needed
concerning the possibility (or objectionable consequence) of a brave new world.
2. Pathological Agency
Another sticking point about the identification of mental health with a values-based notion
of well-being concerns the possibility of ill-chosen values. Recall how, at the end of chapter
two, I considered what the consequences might be for ‘less than fully rational’ people like
successful psychopaths and schizophrenics. I dismissed these cases as unproblematic for
two reasons: one, that we should allow the possibility that unconventional values truly
facilitate well-being in some cases, and two that when it comes down to it, it is always
possible that peoples explicitly stated values do not actually fill that role. I expect objective
measures of well-being to substantiate this.
Still, there is another kind of case in the neighborhood of this issue that may pose
problems. What if it is not a person’s values which are in doubt, but their agency or
perhaps very capacity for autonomy? Can we fail to be agents in such a way that our
individual concerns are no longer a guide to our mental health?1 When does a patient fail
to be competent? Self-reports of patients with depression and compulsions seem to
support this possibility. Some think of depression as characterized by a “diminished
experience of free will” (Ratcliffe, p. 574, 2013). Others note how “[r]easons for actions,
recognized as valid from the agent’s perspective, get overridden or suspended because of
depression and this seems idiotic to the agent herself” (Radoilska, p.1167, 2013). What is it
about illnesses like depression and compulsion that makes them challenges to decisional
1

Many thanks to John Doris and Chapman Davis Waters for interesting discussions on this issue.
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capacity and autonomy? A passing comment from Doris in his book on agency is
illuminating here. As he writes,
“[t]here are frequently obvious differences between clinical and healthy
populations, and some of the most important differences, it seems to me,
are appropriately marked as differences in self-direction: healthy people
control their behavior and order their lives in ways that many suffers of
mental illness cannot… If that’s right, normal and pathological psychologies
can sometimes be distinguished along dimensions of agency (Buss 2012:
667–78), and it becomes tempting to suppose that the many people
fortunate enough to enjoy some measure of mental health also enjoy, in
some measure, the exercise of agency” (p. 34-35, 2015).
I am of a mind to think that differences like these are compatible with an
individualist conception of mental illness. But arguing for that claim will involve deeper
engagement with the literature on agency itself. The question of whether mental illness and
its treatment can be understood in terms of departures from and restorations of agency is
another worth pursuing.
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